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THE LIMITED LIABILIT Y COMPANY: A
CATA LYST EXPOSING THE CORPORATE
INTE GRATION QUESTION
Susan Pace Hamill*
INTRODUCTION
The rise of the domestic limited liability company (LLC)1 from ob
scurity to its present position as a viable, mainstream alternative to the
corporation or partnership was met with enormous enthusiasm by the
business community and the practicing bar.2 First introduced by the
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law.
Ed.
The author gratefully acknowledges Dean Kenneth C. Randall and other faculty col
leagues, who have enthusiastically supported the author's research and other projects,
including the approval of a new course in the University of Alabama's curriculum fo
cusing on LLCs and LLPs, the University of Alabama Law School Foundation, the Ed
ward Brett Randolph Fund, and the William H. Sadler Fund. Valuable comments were
received from Jim Bryce, Norman Stein, Rebecca Rudnick, Bob Peroni, Bill Turnier,
Don Turlington, Will Nelson, and George Yin. The author also greatly appreciates the
hard work and tireless efforts of her research assistants Leah Panayiotou and Carrie
Ellis.
1. The LLC is an unincorporated business organization that contains dissolution,
management, and transferability provisions similar to those of a general partnership but
that can easily be altered to resemble the limited partnership or to approach the corpo
rate model. A related unincorporated business entity that appeared in 1991, the limited
liability partnership (LLP), essentially operates as a general partnership for business
purposes, while offering the partners either partial or total limited liability protection.
The articles written on LLCs and LLPs are too numerous to cite completely. In 1995
four law reviews dedicated entire issues to LLCs and LLPs. See F. Hodge O'Neal Cor
porate and Securities Law Symposium: Limited Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
369 (1995); Symposium, UCs, UPs and the Evolving Corporate Form, 66 U. COLO.
L. REv. 855 (1995); Limited Liability Company Symposium, 25 STETSON L. REv. 253
(1995); 51 Bus. LAW. 1 (1995) (all articles discuss LLCs or LLPs). For an early article
predicting, at a time when only Wyoming and Florida recognized domestic LLCs, that
the LLC's popularity would grow once more states passed LLC statutes, see Susan Pace
Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice for Doing Business?, 41 U.
FLA. L. REV. 721 (1989).
2. See Charles Briggs Davenport, Jr., et al., UC Boosters Blitz Passthrough Ses
sions, 37 TAX NOTES 1019, 1019 (1992) ("[The LLC] was shown around at this year's
Tax Section meeting like a new fighter plane at the Paris Air Show. . . . [T]he hottest
thing in S corporations has nothing to do with S corporations; it has to do with the
LLC."); Richard M. Phillips, From the Editor, 47 Bus. LAW. at xiii (1992) ("[The
LLC is] one of the most important developments in business law today . . . . While to
date only a handful of states have adopted legislation providing for limited liability
companies, the train is out of the station. Years from now, this may be viewed as the
-
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State of Wyoming in 19773 and recognized by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) as a partnership for federal income tax purposes in 1988,4
the LLC offers for the first time a domestic entity that combines the tax
advantages of a partnership with limited liability protection for all
members, an advantage commonly associated with corporations.5 The
advantages of the partnership tax provisions include one level of tax at
the owner level, flexible rules to allocate profits and losses among the
owners, and the opportunity for owners to deduct losses or receive dis
tributions attributable to the partnership's liabilities.6 By contrast, corpo
rations are taxed at both the entity and the shareholder level,7 unless
they elect subchapter S, which taxes closely held corporations only
once - at the owner level - under a set of rules far less favorable and
flexible than the partnership provisions.8 However, unlike shareholders
of corporations who bear no statutory personal liability for the corpora-

dawn of a new era in business entities. "); Josephine Marcotty, State To Allow Business
Hybrid That Combines the Advantages of Corporate and Tax Worlds, STAR TRIB.,
(Minneapolis-St Paul) Apr. 30, 1992, at IO ("[Minnesota's law] slid so smoothly
through the House and Senate that .. . one legislator described it as 'a bipartisan love
fest.' . . . [The LLC] can be useful to many types of businesses and has little down
side. "); Daniel B. Moskowitz, New Way To Organize Business ls Gaining Wider Ac
ceptance, WASH. PosT, Nov. 4, 1991, at F14 ("[The LLC] is exciting lawyers around
the country and is likely to grow in importance over the next few years. "); Jeffrey A.
Tannenbaum, Forming as a Limited Liability Company Offers Best of Both Worlds,
WALL ST. J. , May 14, 1991, at B2 ("LLCs are an easy sell.").
3. See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws
537 (1977) (codified as WYO. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -144 (1989 & Supp. 1995). The
very first domestic unincorporated entity to offer limited liability and partnership taxa
tion, the limited partnership association, never gained widespread acceptance by the
states and enjoyed no significant use. Unlike LLCs, limited partnership associations
were burdened with restrictions requiring either the principal place of business or the
principal office to be in the state of organization. Moreover, some of the statutes se
verely limited the number of owners. See Hamill, supra note 1, at 722 n.9.
4. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
5. The question of whether the LLC offers significant business advantages over
the partnership and corporation above and beyond the tax advantage of combining part
nership tax treatment with statutory limited liability protection is beyond the scope of
this article.
6. For an exhaustive discussion of the detail on how the partnership tax rules
work, see WILLIAM s. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1996).
7. For an exhaustive discussion of the tax rules for corporations, see BORIS I.
BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS (6th ed. 1994); see also infra notes 98-111, 134, 136, 140 and
accompanying text.
8. See Susan Kalinka, The Limited Liability Company and Subchapter S: Classifi
cation Issues Revisited, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1083 (1992); infra text accompanying notes
75-80, 85. See generally JAMES s. EUSTICE & JOEL D. KUNTZ, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1993); DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF s CORPORATIONS (rev. ed. 1992).
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tion's debts,9 under the partnership statutes, at least one partner must
bear personal liability for the debts and obligations of the partnership. 10
By combining the best of both worlds, partnership taxation and
limited liability, the LLC revolution can be characterized as tax
driven.11 Nevertheless, some commentators believe that it is the LLC's
superior business provisions that will cause LLCs to continue to rise in
popularity.12 Although the LLC's business provisions may be character
istic of either partnerships or corporations, in toto they produce a truly
unique and new business entity that cannot be aligned categorically
with either of the more traditional forms.13 For example, the statutory
provisions addressing the management and control of the LLC generally
vest agency authority and governance rights in all members, as if they
were partners in a general partnership. However, LLC members, unlike
general partners, can adopt a management structure resembling those of
corporations or limited partnerships by appointing managers. The LLC's
managers, holding the power to make important policy decisions and to
bind the LLC in day-to-day business transactions, take on the roles held
both by general partners of limited partnerships and by corporate direc
tors and officers.14
Regardless of whether the motivation is tax or business related, the
use and acceptance of LLCs as a serious alternative to the partnership
and the corporation exponentially increased between 1988 and 1995 and
will probably grow more each year.15 Indeed, some commentators be
lieve the LLC will largely replace the partnership and the closely held
corporation and emerge as the dominant form of business for nonpub
licly traded entities.16

9. See infra section III .B.
10. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 47-67, 216-27 and accompanying text.
12. "LLCs must be rescued from the grasp of the tax lawyers." AALS Tax Section
Looks at LLCs, 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 17-H, 17-H (1996) [hereinafter AALS Tax Sec
tion] (quoting Professor Larry Ribstein) (arguing that LLCs offer independent business
advantages).
13. See Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the
Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375 (1992).
14. See UNIF. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT§§ 301, 404, 6A U.L.A. 425
(1995).
15. "Everything is driven by tax and the rest of the world will accommodate
. . . " AALS Tax Section, supra note 12, at 17-H (quoting Professor Jerry Kurtz's re
sponse to Larry Ribstein's assertion that the LLC offers independent business advan
tages); see infra section LB.
16. See Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Liability Company and the Future of Business
Taxation: A Comment on Professor Berger's Plan, 47 TAX L. REv. 815, 820 (1992);
see also supra notes 1-2. Commentators are just starting to speculate on the future pop
ularity of the LLP. Some believe that LLPs will evolve as the business form of choice
.
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The rise of the LLC, however, has not been greeted with uniform
zeal. Said one critic: "The federal government has opened up a candy
store." 17 This pithy comment metaphorically sums up the underlying
and often unarticulated concern hidden in the shadows of the LLC eu
phoria. Some commentators have expressed concern that the LLC could
undermine the policy behind the two-tier tax imposed on corporations
and shareholders, or the restrictions under the subchapter S regime, or
both.18
For over fifty years, scholars, practitioners, and legislators have de
bated whether the tax imposed at both the corporate and shareholder
levels represents sound tax policy - whether this two-tier tax should
be eliminated or mitigated.19 This question, commonly referred to as the

for many transactions and may even surpass the LLC. See generally Robert R. Keatinge
et al., Limited Liability Partnerships: The Next Step in the Evolution of the Unincorpo
rated Business Organi<.ation, 51 Bus. LAW. 147 (1995). Because the rise of the LLP
exposes the corporate integration issue as well (both LLCs and LLPs provide one level
of taxation under the partnership provisions and limited liability), the analysis in the ar
ticle is not affected by the choice between LLCs and LLPs.
17. New York Contemplates Cost of Partnership Treatment for Limited Liability
Companies, 1992 TAX NOTES TODAY, 243-10 (quoting from James W. Wetzler, New
York State Commissioner of Taxation and Finance).
18. See Karen C. Burke, The Uncertain Future of Limited Liability Companies, 12
AM. J. TAX POLY. 13, 15 (1995); Daniel S. Goldberg, The Tax Treatment of Limited Li
ability Companies: Law in Search of Policy, 50 Bus. LAW. 995 (1995); William J.
Rands, Passthrough Entities and Their Unprincipled Differences Under Federal Tax
Law, 49 SMU L. REv. 15 (1995).
19. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate
Taxation, 105 YALE LJ. 325 (1995); Glenn E. Coven, Corporate Tax Policy for the
Twenty-First Century: Integration and Redeeming Social Value, 50 W A SH & LEE L.
REv. 495 (1993); Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through
Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REv. 265 (1995); Martin D.
Ginsburg, Maintaining Subchapter S in an Integrated Tax World, 41 TAX L. REv. 665
(1992); Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corpo
rate Income, 68 N.C. L. REv. 613 (1990); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Integration of Per
sonal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Propos
als, 88 HARv. L. REv. 532 (1975); John K. McNulty, Preserving the Virtues of
Subchapter S in an Integrated World, 41 TAX L. REv. 681 (1992); Fred W. Peel, A Pro
posal for Eliminating Double Taxation of Corporate Dividends, 39 TAX LAW. 1 (1985);
Joseph S. Platt, Integration and Correlation -The Treasury Proposal, 3 TAX L. REv.
59 (1947); Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax
World?, 39 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 965 (1988-1989); Deborah H.Schenk, Complete In
tegration in a Partial Integration World, 47 TAX L. REV. 697 (1992); Michael L.
Schier, Taxing Corporate Income Once (or Hopefully Not at All): A Practitioner's Com
parison of the Treasury and ALI Integration Models, 41 TAX L. REv. 509 (1992); Reed
H. Shuldiner, Corporate Integration: Do the Uncertainties Outweigh the Benefits?, 47
TAX L. REv. 653 (1992); Emil M. Sunley, Corporate Integration: An Economic Per
spective, 41 TAX L. REv. 621 (1992); Scott A. Taylor, Corporate Integration in the
Federal Income Tax: Lessons from the Past and a Proposal for the Future, I 0 V A TAX
REv. 237 (1990); Alvin C. Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Cor.

.
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"corporate integration issue," arguably represents one of the most im
portant tax policy issues confronting U.S. lawmakers today. Because the
corporation historically has been the only domestic entity to offer lim
ited liability protection for all owners, and because the corporate tax re
gime applies per se to all domestic corporations,20 the question whether,
and under what circumstances, limited liability protection should carry
the price of the corporate tax must be resolved before one affirmatively
answers the corporate integration issue.21 Because LLCs offer limited li
ability by statute and partnership taxation, they appear to offer a new
mechanism

to

achieve

corporate

integration

even

though

U.S.

lawmakers have not yet sanctioned corporate integration in any form.22
This observation has led some commentators to question whether LLCs
represent an effort by the states to achieve corporate integration's bene
fits inappropriately without the approval of Congress.23 The LLC's
strongest critics view the LLC as a direct threat to the corporate tax
base, arguing that LLCs should either be taxed as corporations or le
gally limited in some other fashion.24

porate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REv. 717 (1981); George K. Ym, Corporate Inte
gration and the Search for the Pragmatic Ideal, 47 TAX L. REV. 431 (1992); Eric M.
Zolt, Corporate Integration After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A State of Dise
quilibrium, 66 N.C. L. REv. 839 (1988).
In response to section 634 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat) 2282, the Department of Treasury issued a comprehensive
study on the effect of the corporate tax and the corporate integration question. See RE
PORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVID
UAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS (Jan. 1992). Later on that year the Department
of the Treasury issued a report recommending that corporate integration be adopted, so
as to exclude dividends from the shareholder's income. See DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, A RECOMMENDATION FOR INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS (Dec. 1992).
20. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2)-(3) (1994) (statutory defmitions of corporations and
partnership literally do not allow corporations to be taxed as partnerships); see also
Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,953 (May 14, 1979) (citing Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819)); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-21-084 (Feb. 27, 1979); Gen. Couns.
Mem. 37,127 (May 18, 1977).
21. See infra notes 32-37, 172-80, 185-89 and accompanying text
22. See supra notes 7, 19 and accompanying text
23. See sources cited supra note 18; see also Use of Limited Liability Companies
Seen Not Jeopardizing Corporate Tax Base, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 59, at J-1 (Mar.
30, 1993) [hereinafter Use of Limited Liability Companies] (stating that the LLC "has
opened the floodgates to do-it-yourself integration, and this is not the proper way to ap
proach the question of integrating the corporate tax" (quoting Donald Alexander, for
mer IRS Commissioner, criticizing the increased use of LLCs as an inappropriate way
for states to eliminate the two-tier corporate tax)).
24. See Lee A. Sheppard, The Dark Side of Limited Liability Companies, 62 TAX
NOTES TODAY, 1441 (1992), at 1441; James W. Wetzler, Federal Tax Policy and the
States: Corporate Integration, 46 NATL. TAX J. 393, 396 (1993); New York Official
Says Corporate Integration Ignores Revenue Impact on States, 1993 TAX NOTES To-
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This article demonstrates that the rise of the LLC will not materi
ally reduce the corporate tax base, and uses the LLC phenomenon to
expose two major problems in current corporate tax law: the intolerable
inequities of imposing the corporate tax on small corporations, and the
distortions caused by, as well as the conflicting signals within, the cor
porate tax structure as applied to large corporations. Part I attributes the
energy that fuels the LLC's rise to Congress's failure to address the cor
porate integration question. The number of new state LLC enactments
and LLC filings showed minimal activity until the IRS confirmed part
nership status for the LLC form, at which point there was explosive
growth in new state enactments and LLC filings. This evidence illus
trates that the sole attraction of this new business form was the desire to
obtain statutory limited liability and flow-through taxation under the
partnership regime - the void left open by the corporate integration
question. Moreover, as new LLC state filings showed geometric growth,
both the IRS and Congress were confronted with the effect of LLCs on
the different tax regimes that are accorded partnerships and corporations
- another aspect of the corporate integration issue.
Part II examines the critical question of whether the increased use
of LLCs amounts to an unsanctioned backdoor to corporate integration,
and concludes that it does not. Even before the LLC developed, small
businesses who could afford the necessary transaction costs were able
to achieve limited liability and one level of taxation. Part II notes that
LLCs cannot threaten tax revenues collected from publicly traded cor
porations, because the tax law forces all publicly traded entities to bear
the corporate tax. Part II further illustrates that LLCs theoretically chal
lenge tax revenues collected from larger, nonpublicly traded corpora
tions, where the asset base and level of ownership has expanded beyond
the closely held range. Part II concludes, however, that this theoretical
ability to undermine the corporate tax will not materialize because cer
tain practical constraints, mainly the unwillingness of tax-exempt and
foreign investors to purchase noncorporate equity, will prevent larger
nonpublic businesses from using LLCs to avoid the corporate tax.
Part III explores the impact of the increased use of the LLC form
on the substantive resolution of the corporate integration issue, by fo
cusing separately on closely held corporations with a relatively modest

102-3 ("[LLCs] will create a significant federal revenue loss because privately
held C corporations pay significant corporate income taxes . . . ." (quoting James W.
Wetzler, Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, New York State)); Tax Revenues Will
Suffer, but Limited Liability Companies May Be Here To Stay, 62 TAX NOTES TODAY,
233-34 (1992) (asserting that LLCs will cause "big holes in the federal corporate tax
base " (quoting Lee A. Sheppard, Contributing Editor, Tax Notes)).
DAY,
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asset base and on larger corporations where the asset base and owner
ship level has extended beyond the closely held range. Careful tax plan
ning always allowed closely held businesses the opportunity to obtain
limited liability and one level of tax. However, because the LLC offers
these benefits with minimal transaction costs, closely held businesses
will continue to choose the LLC over the corporation form in large
numbers without examining the LLC's business benefits or detriments.
Thus, it is impossible to tell whether or not the LLC offers material
business advantages over the close corporation. This preference for the
LLC exposes the inequities of applying the corporate tax to small incor
porated businesses as compared to the more favorable and flexible part
nership tax provisions enjoyed by LLCs. Consequently, by exposing
these inequities, the increased use of LLCs has demonstrated the de
mand for some form of corporate integration, at least for closely held
corporations.
Part ill recognizes that, because LLCs do not pose a threat to the
taxation of larger corporations, lawmakers could leave LLCs alone and
maintain the corporate tax in its current form without affecting the num
ber of larger businesses needing to incorporate. Part ill argues, how
ever, that as LLCs continue to multiply, their sheer numbers, combined
with their theoretical challenge to the corporate tax revenues paid by
these

larger

corporations,

will

make

it

increasingly

difficult

for

lawmakers to avoid the corporate integration issue. The LLC's ability to
provide limited liability combined with one level of tax under the part
nership provisions brings to the surface the question of what role lim
ited liability should play when imposing the corporate tax. Moreover,
the practical reasons that prevent LLCs from being a real threat to the
corporate tax paid by larger corporations help expose certain fundamen
tal problems within the corporate tax structure: the distortions in invest
ment decisions caused by the distinctions drawn between taxable and
tax-exempt and foreign investors, as well as the disparate treatment be
tween debt and equity.
I.

THE RISE OF THE LLC AND THE CORPORATE INTEGRATION
ISSUE
A.

LLCs Before the Recognition of Partnership Status

The LLC's very creation is linked to the corporate integration is
sue. After a failed attempt in Alaska, the Hamilton Oil Company, on
behalf of certain foreign oil and gas clients, lobbied the Wyoming legis-
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lature to create a domestic business entity that mirrored the limitada.25
Unlike the U.S. entities available at that time, the limitada provided di
rect limited liability for all owners coupled with the ability to comply
with partnership classification regulations for U.S. income tax purposes.
On March 4, 1977, the Wyoming Legislature responded to these lobby
ing efforts by passing the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act.26
U.S. law generally forces all corporations (the only domestic entity
providing for direct statutory limited liability protection) to be taxed
under the two-tier tax regime and all partnerships to expose at least one
partner to personal liability for the partnership's debts. Due to the high
risk and speculative nature of their investments, Hamilton Oil Com
pany's foreign clients needed a flow-through entity to provide one level
of tax and limited liability. Because the tax law forbids foreign share
holders from owning stock in an S corporation, they could not obtain
limited liability and one level of tax using the corporate form.27 Despite
the establishment of statutory limited liability protection for all mem
bers, the Wyoming LLC clearly met the standards to obtain partnership
classification, because the Wyoming statute required the LLC to lack
both continuity of life and free transferability of interests - two out of
the four corporate characteristics unincorporated entities must lack to
secure partnership classification - regardless of the members' operat
ing agreement.28 After experiencing some resistance from the IRS,29 the
Wyoming Secretary of State's Office obtained a private letter ruling30
that classified the Wyoming LLC as a partnership for tax purposes.31

25. A

limitada is a foreign business entity that offers the ability to combine lim

ited liability with other business characteristics normally associated with U.S. partner
ships. These foreign entities were able to secure one level of tax for U.S. purposes
under the partnership provisions. See infra note 42. Certain administrative difficulties
and other difficulties related to the foreign law had made it impractical to continue to
use these foreign limitadas. See William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Ori
gins and Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 855 (1995); Thomas N. Long, The Wyo
ming Limited Liability Company (Feb. 15, 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).

26. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1989).
27. See Letter from AJ. Miller to Walter Urbigkit, Chief Justice Wyoming Su
preme Court (June 5, 1992); Open letter by Frank Burke (Mar. 25, 1993) (describing
early history of LLCs).

28. See WYO. STAT. ANN.§§ 17-15-123 to -123 (1989). For a detailed description
of the classification regulations as applied to the Wyoming LLC Act, see Hamill, supra
note

1.
29. See sources cited supra note 25.
30. Because private letter rulings only provide authority to the individual taxpayer

requesting it, the Wyoming private letter ruling could not have launched the LLC move
ment on a wide scale.
31. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-060-82 (Nov. 18, 1980).

November
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On the eve of the private letter ruling's release,32 the IRS issued
proposed amendments to the state's entity classification regulations that
would automatically treat all limited liability companies as associations
taxable as corporations.33 Although undoubtedly offended by the spe
cial-interest motivation behind the Wyoming LLC legislation,34 the IRS
may also have viewed the newly invented domestic LLC as a potential
threat that, if allowed to spread, would precipitously undermine the tax
revenues collected from corporations.
By defining a "limited liability company" as any organization in
which all owners enjoy limited liability protection under local law, the
IRS's proposed regulations ignored all other similar business arrange
ments (for example, a minimally capitalized corporate general partner)
that also provide limited liability protection.35 The proposed regulations,
therefore, would have failed to establish limited liability36 as a meaning
ful criterion for imposing the corporate tax.37 Many state law partner
ships would have continued to enjoy limited liability in substance by
using corporations as intermediaries between the partnership and the
real partner.38 Moreover, closely held corporations could continue to
avoid the corporate tax by paying out most, if not all, of their net prof
its in deductible items.39
Although clearly devastating to the Wyoming LLC, the proposed
regulations received the strongest criticism from representatives of
equipment-leasing trusts and U.S. persons participating in foreign enter
prises.40 Before the IRS issued these proposed regulations,41 limitadas,
as well as other foreign entities that enjoyed limited liability protection
by statute, were often classified as partnerships and, in some cases, re-

32. See sources cited supra note 25.
33. See 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (1980).
34. This represents pure speculation on the author's part based on knowledge of
how the government works and certain comments made by government employees long
after the proposed regulations were issued and withdrawn.
35. The preamble to these proposed regulations explicitly states that limited part
nerships organized in a �tate with statutory default provisions materially corresponding
to the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act and general partnerships governed by
state law similarly adopting the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act will not be
subject to per se association treatment regardless of any substantive arrangements by the
general partners to limit their liability exposure. See 45 Fed. Reg.
36. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.

37. See infra section III.A.
38. See infra notes 87-91 , 1 85-87 and accompanying text.
39. See infra section II.A.
40. See 1.R.S. News Release IR-82-145 (Dec. 1-6, 1982).
41. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text

75,709 (1980).
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ceived favorable partnership classification in private letter rulings.42
Like the Wyoming LLC, these foreign entities would automatically
have been taxed as corporations under the proposed regulations.43 The
IRS later withdrew its proposal and stated that it would conduct an ex
tensive study concerning the effects of the limited liability characteristic
on entity classification.44
Both the LLC's creation and its viability as a serious business form
can be directly linked to the failure of lawmakers to resolve the corpo
rate integration issue affirmatively. The nearly ten-year duration of the
IRS's study, during which little activity occurred with respect to LLCs,
suggests that the IRS was reluctant to allow a domestic limited liability
entity to enjoy the benefits of the partnership tax regime. Before Wyo
ming passed the first statute allowing for domestic LLCs, no other unin
corporated domestic business form had ever combined corporate limited
liability and partnership taxation while providing business provisions
offering a serious possibility of widespread use. By providing limited li
ability and one level of tax under the partnership provisions, the LLC
created a direct route for small business to fill the void left open by the
partnership and corporate tax regimes. If the tax system provided for
corporate integration, the LLC probably would not have been born and
without the critical partnership classification, the LLC had no chance of
expanding throughout the country.
Although in 1982 Florida enacted an LLC statute, presumably to
lure capital into the state,45 no other states recognized the LLC while its
tax status remained in limbo. Thus, the LLC remained imprisoned as a
tax hostage until the IRS resolved the partnership classification issue.
During this period, predictably few businesses chose to become LLCs.
Less than one hundred groups became LLCs before the entity finally re
ceived partnership status.46

42. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 1 8, 1980); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-19-1 12 (Feb.
15, 1980); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-07-029 (Nov. 21, 1979); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-07-029 (Nov. 2,
1979); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-04-140 (Nov. 2, 1979); Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 78-41-047 (July 14,
1978); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-41-042 (July 14, 1978); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 77-37-049 (June 17,
1977). The language of these private letter rulings strongly indicates that the limited lia
bility protection enjoyed by the owners of the foreign entity comes directly from the
foreign law and was not created contractually by the owners.

43. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
44. See Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 30 (Jan. 14, 1983); supra notes 33, 35.
45. See FLA. STAT. §§ 608.401-.514 (1995); Richard Johnson, Comment, The
Limited Liability Company Act, 1 1 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 387, 387 (1983).
46. Approximately 44 LLCs formed in Wyoming before the IRS issued Revenue
Ruling 88-76. See Telephone Interview with Sharon Cochran, Office of the Wyoming
Secretary of State (Jan. 3 1 , 1996) [hereinafter Cochran Interview]. The 44 LLC filings
in Wyoming had to be estimated, because the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 88-76 on Sep-

November 1996]

B.

LLCs and Corporate Integration

403

LLCs After the Recognition of Partnership Status

As a result of its study, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 88-76 in
1988,47 which permitted the LLC to secure partnership classification de
spite the presence of limited liability. After this long-awaited ruling,
LLCs leapt from obscurity to become a well known and accepted form
in less than ten years. In 1990 Colorado and Kansas both passed LLC
statutes, and in 1991 four more states (Nevada, Texas, Utah and Vrr
ginia) joined them.48 Then, in 1992 and 1993, LLC legislation swept the
country. In 1992 ten more states, including Delaware, passed LLC stat
utes,49 and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws formed a drafting committee to produce a Uniform Limited Lia
bility Company Act.50 In 1993 eighteen more states, the largest number
tember 2, 1988 and the Wyoming Secretary of State's Office keeps records on a calen
dar-year basis. As of December 31, 1987, a total of 40 business ventures had filed to
become LLCs. The estimated number of LLC filings between January 1, 1988, and the
release of Revenue Ruling 88-76 was determined by adding the average number of new
LLC filings per year from 1977 through 1987, 4, to 40. Although 12 new LLCs were
formed in 1988, it is reasonable to conclude that the number formed between January 1,
1988, and September 2, 1988, was commensurate with the average of four filings per
year for the 10 years before Revenue Ruling 88-76. Accordingly, this estimate assumes
that eight new LLCs registered between the issue date of Revenue Ruling 88-76 and
December 31, 1988 - the difference between 12, the total number of LLC filings in
1988, and 4.
Although the Florida Secretary of State's Office only calculates total current LLCs
registered in the state without breaking down the number of filings year by year, based
upon the Wyoming filing data, it is reasonable to assume that the number of pre
Revenue Ruling 88-76 Florida LLCs was similarly modest As of December 31, 1995,
Florida had 2709 active LLCs and 903 inactive LLCs (presumably entities existing as
shells not actively engaging in businesses), indicating that Florida currently has on re
cord 3612 existing LLCs. Telephone Interview with Diane Cushing, Office of the Flor
ida Secretary of State (Jan. 17, 1996) [hereinafter Cushing Interview]. Comparing the
3612 Florida LLCs with the total number of Wyoming filings from 1977 to 1995, 4631,
it appears unlikely that the number of pre-Revenue Ruling 88-76 LLC filings in Florida
exceeded that in Wyoming.
47. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
48. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-101 to -1101 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17-7601 to -7656 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.010 to 86.571 (Michie
1991); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 1528n, arts. 1.01-11.07 (West 1991); UTAH
CODE ANN.§§ 48-26-101 to 48-26-157 (1991), VA. CODE ANN.§§ 13.1-1000 to 13.11123 (Michie 1991).
49. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to -857 (Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6,§§ 18-101 to 1107 (1995 & Supp. 1996); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 805, para.
180/1-1 to 180/60-1 (1995 & Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE§§ 490A.100 to .1601 (1995);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 12:1301 to :1369 (West 1994); Mo. CORPS. & As SNS. CODE
ANN. §§ 4A-101 to -1103 (1993 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. §§ 322B.01 to .960
(1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000-2060 (West Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 7-16-1 to -75 (1992 & Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE§§ 31B-I-101 to 13-13-6 (1996).

50. Letter from Edith 0. Davies, Executive Secretary, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (on file with author) (Sept 4, 1992); Letter
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to enact LLC legislation in any single year, passed statutes.s1 By the fall
of 1996, eight years after the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 88-76, all fifty
states and the District of Columbia recognized LLCs.s2 In 1995 the Na
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved
the final version of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act.s3
The number of business ventures filing as LLCs mirrored the me
teoric pace of state enactment of LLC statutes.s4 Between September 2,
1988, the eve of the IRS's release of Revenue Ruling 88-76 (when the
U.S. had less than 100 LLC filings) and December 31, 1995, over
210,000 business ventures filed to become LLCs, a pace that can only
be explained by the LLC's ability to secure limited liability and partner
ship taxation, a combination lying at the heart of the corporate integra
tion issue.ss
For some perspective it is necessary to compare the growth in LLC
filings to U.S. corporation and partnership data. In 1988 approximately

from Edward I. Cutler, Chair of Uniform Limited Liability Company Act Drafting
Committee to Susan Pace Hamill (Aug. 19, 1992) (on file with author).
51. See ALA. CODE§§ 10-12-1 to -61 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 4-32-107 to 1316 (Michie 1996), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-100 to -242 (West Supp. 1996);
GA. CODE ANN.§§ 14-11-100 to -1109 (1994 & Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE§§ 53-601
to -672 (1994 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 to -13-1 (West 1994 &
Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 450.4101 to .5200 (West Supp. 1996); Mo.
REv. STAT. §§ 347.010 to .187 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to -1307
(1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2601 to -2653 (Supp. 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 304C:l to :85 (1995); NJ. REv. STAT.§§ 42:2b-l to -70 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 53-19-1 to -74 (Michie Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 57C-l-01 to -10-07 (Supp.
1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -155 (Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 63.001 to .990 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§§ 47-34-1 to -59 (Supp. 1996);
WIS. STAT. §§ 183.0102 to .1206 (1996).
52. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.010 - .995 (Supp. 1995); CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 17000-17705 (West Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN.§§ 41-101 to -148 (Supp. 1996);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.001-.455 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 601-762 (West 1996); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 156C, § 1-68 (Supp.
1995); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-101 to -1201 (Supp. 1995); Omo REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 1705.01 to .58 (Anderson Supp. 1995); PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 890108998

(1995); s.c. CODE ANN.§§ 33-43-101 to -1409 (La. Co-op. Supp. 1995); TENN. Pus.
CODE ANN.§§ 48-201-101 to -248-606 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3001-3162
(Michie Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE§§ 25.15.005 to .902 (1994); HAWAII 1995

HI S.B. 2723 (signed June 7, 1996, effective Apr. 1, 1997).
53. See also Advisors Report on the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(Mar. 13, 1995), reprinted in RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPA
NIES (1995).
54. For a complete year-by-year and state-by-state breakdown of LLC filings from
September 2, 1988 to December 31, 1995, see Appendix.
55. Undoubtedly some of these new filings are shells on shelves and, therefore, we
cannot estimate to what extent these filings represent true going concerns.
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3.56 million corporations56 and 1.65 million partnerships57 filed income
tax returns. By 1992, the latest year Statistics of Income makes income
tax return information available, approximately 3.87 million corpora
tions filed returns, representing an increase of 8.6% over the 1988 re
turns, while approximately 1.48 million partnerships filed returns, repre
senting a decrease by 9.2% when compared to the 1988 returns.58 The
number of LLC filings, which totaled approximately 2 10,000 by 1995,
looks modest by comparison, but the explosive percentage increase in
LLCs compared with the small percentage increase in corporations and
decrease in partnerships, clearly reflects a rapidly growing trend of new
businesses choosing LLCs. The percentage increase of LLCs between
1992 and 1995 was well over 1600% (comparing the 7000 new LLC
filings in 1992 with the 1 15,000 new LLC filings in 1995), assuredly a
far greater increase than the 1995 corporate and partnership income tax
returns will likely show when those statistics become available.59
Although the LLC still trails the corporation in total number of ex
isting entities and new filings, the tremendous rise in new LLC filings
on a percentage basis from 1990 through 1995 indicates that the LLC
has at the very least become a serious choice for doing business and
may in fact become the entity of choice in the future. Moreover, leading
56. See STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS
OF INCOME: 1988 CORPORATIONS INCOME TAX RETuRNs 8 [hereinafter STATISTICS
OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS 1988].
57. See STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS
OF INCOME: 1988 PARTNERSIDP INCOME TAX RETuRNs (this number includes fil
ings for both general and limited partnerships). General partnership returns equaled 1 .37
million, and limited partnership returns equaled 285,000. Id.

58. STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF
INCOME: 1992 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETuRNs [hereinafter STATISTICS OF
INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 1992]; STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVE
NUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1992 PARTNERSIDP INCOME TAX RETURNS.
59. See infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text. New LLC filings at the state
level and corporate and partnership income tax return filings provide comparable, but
not perfectly equivalent information. The income tax return filings represent the number
of existing corporations or partnerships, regardless of when they were formed, while the
LLC filings generally measure new filings each year.
Comparing new LLC filings to new corporate filings in a particular state, Dela
ware, similarly shows the corporation in the lead when focusing on gross numbers, with
the LLC showing much more growth potential on a percentage basis. In Delaware, the
number of new corporations filed in 1994 and 1995 totaled 44,762 and 47,851 respec
tively, representing an increase of 6.9%. In those years, new Delaware LLC filings grew
from 2795 in 1994 to 6483 in 1995, an increase of 132%. Facsimile from Pauline Fry,
Office of Delaware Department of State (Feb. 13, 1996) (on file with author). Moreo
ver, the gross number of new corporate filings, which include existing businesses that
must incorporate in order to enter the capital equity markets, is distortively high when
attempting to measure the trend of new businesses choosing either the corporate or LLC
forms.

See infra notes 149-71.
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business states, such as New York, California, and Delaware, have
taken the lead in LLC formation, notwithstanding their relatively late
enactments of LLC statutes. By securing enormous acceptance in these
states, LLCs have become an accepted mainstream form for doing busi
ness. The stagnation of LLCs before Revenue Ruling 88-76, contrasted
with their tremendous growth after that ruling, shows that the energy
fueling the LLC's rise is the LLC's ability to directly combine the tax
advantages of a partnership with the statutory limited liability previ
ously only enjoyed by corporations - the void left open by lawmakers'
failure to solve the corporate integration issue.
As the LLC rose in prominence, the IRS and other branches of
government were forced to deal with both the presence of LLCs and
their effect on the tax system.60 From 1990 to 1995, the IRS spent an
enormous amount of time solving certain technical tax issues created by
LLCs.61 Taxpayers and the bar focused on questions concerning how the
partnership classification regulations applied to LLCs. Before 1995 the
partnership classification regulations effectively prevented larger,
widely held businesses from using the LLC form, because it was not
clear whether LLC managers could be analogized to the general part
ners of limited partnerships when applying the technical rules of the
partnership classification regulations.62 In early 1995, the IRS virtually
destroyed all of the remaining tax handicaps that held LLCs back by al
lowing them to largely treat LLC managers as general partners and oth
erwise apply the partnership classification regulations in the same flexi
ble manner applied to limited partnerships.63 Shortly thereafter, the IRS
proposed amendments to the classification regulations allowing unincor
porated businesses to choose partnership or corporate taxation regard
less of their business characteristics.64 Because LLCs have been freed
60. See supra text accompanying notes 53-7 1 .
61. See Susan Pace Hamill, Th e Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability Companies

and Limited Partnerships: A Case for Eliminating the Partnership Classification Regu
lations, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 589-98 (1995) (describing in detail the technical
problems confronted by the Service from 1990 until it issued Revenue Procedure 9510).
62. See id.
63. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501 .
64. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § § 301 .7701-1 t o 7701-3, 61 Fed. Reg. 21989 (1996),
previously discussed in l.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297. The question of whether
pass-through entities should receive the benefits and flexibility offered by the partner
ship tax provisions is beyond the scope of this article. The recent promulgation of the
anti-abuse regulation, see Treas. Reg. § 1 .701-2 (as amended in 1995), suggests that the
Treasury believes at least some partnerships are being used inappropriately. Many have
criticized the partnership tax rules. See Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither Partnership Taxa
tion?, 41 TAX L. REv. 105 (1991); Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special
Allocations, 46 TAX L. REv. 1 (1990). For a defense of the policy behind the funda-
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from the restrictions of the classification regulations that once caused
many businesses to favor limited partnerships,65 the LLC form can now
compete with all forms of partnership, including widely held limited
partnerships, on their business merits alone - indeed, the LLC may be
judged superior.66 Moreover, the ability of widely held businesses to
choose the LLC form without regard to the classification regulations al
lows LLCs to enjoy at least a theoretical tax advantage over all nonpub
licly traded corporations.67
The ability of businesses to choose the LLC form instead of the
corporation clearly added an additional dimension to the already contro
versial corporate integration issue, and lawmakers predictably were in
terested in exploring the rise of LLCs. In early 1993, the House Ways
and Means Select Revenue Measure Subcommittee announced a plan to
hold hearings addressing a number of topics, including the corporate in
tegration question generally and the increased use of LLCs.68 Although
the Chairman, Charles Rangel (D-NY), identified no official concerns
with LLCs,69 unofficial sources indicate that lawmakers were interested
in examining whether LLCs resulted in any revenue loss and if a better
means existed to distinguish partnerships from corporations.70 As dis
cussed later in this article, the concern of an LLC-created revenue loss
will prove groundless.71 However, Congress's interest in seeking a bet
ter way to distinguish partnerships and corporations suggests that
lawmakers may realize that the current system for imposing the corpo
rate tax is inequitable and inconsis�ent.72 Regardless, both of these is
sues are significant, as they lie at the center of the corporate integration
debate.73
By mid-1993, both lawmakers and the bar evinced intense interest
in relaxing the restrictions faced by S corporations.74 This culminated in

mental partnership taxation rules, see Rebecca S. Rudnick, Enforcing the Fundamental
Premises of Partnership Taxation, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 229 (1993).
65. See Hamill, supra note 61, at 589-92.
66. See id. at 607.
67. See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text
68. See HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS, Feb. 3, 1993, p. 2109.
69. See Use of Limited Liability Companies, supra note 23, at J-1.
70. See supra note 68; Congress May Examine IRS Position on LLCs in Future,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at G-7 (Apr. 15, 1994).
71. See infra sections II.A.-B.
72. But cf. supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 19.
74. An S corporation is a closely held corporation (no more than 35 shareholders
(75 after effective date of 1996 legislation)) that has elected to be taxed under a special
set of rules that allows one level of tax at the shareholder level with many restrictions
not applicable to partnerships. A significant restriction that contributed greatly to the
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the proposal of the S Corporation Reform Act of 1995 and the relaxa
tion of certain S corporation restrictions as part of the Small Business
Job Protection Act of 1996, signed on August 20, 1996.75 The commit
tee responsible for the S Corporation Reform Act proposal identified
the rise of the LLC as one of the most important reasons for passing the
legislation.76 Commentators asserted that without reform S corporations
would be unable to compete for capital with LLCs.77 At least from the
perspective of closely held businesses the 1995 proposal and the Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996 appear to address the relationship
between the increased use of LLCs and the corporate integration ques
tion by mitigating certain inequities among partnerships, LLCs, and S
corporations.78 Although the 1995 proposal and the 1996 legislation
loosen up the limitations imposed on the number and the kinds of per
sons that can be S corporation shareholders and make other changes,79
the improvements at best nip at the margin of the inequities between in
corporated and unincorporated business forms.8° Consequently, regard
less of whether or not Congress further relaxes the S corporation re
strictions as contemplated by the proposed S Corporation Reform Act
first LLC statutory enactment is the rule denying S corporation eligibility to any corpo
ration with a foreign shareholder. See supra note 8.
75. See Hearing on S.327, S.758, and H.R.1215 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation
& IRS Oversight of the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter Senate

S Hearing]; see also Finance Members Consider Whether UCs Trump S Corp. Reform,
TAX NOTES 1711 (1995).
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 allows S corporations to have 75
shareholders instead of 35, relaxes the rules related to certain trusts permitted as share
holders, allows financial institutions to hold safe harbor debt, allows S corporations to
hold subsidiaries, allows certain tax-exempt organizations to be shareholders, and makes
other changes. See H R. 3448, 142 CONG. REc. H9568, H9574-77 (1996) (enacted)
(provisions of Small Business Job Protection Act relating to S corporations); see also
Clinton Signs Health Insurance and Small Business Bills, 72 TAX NOTES 1079 (1996).
76. See Senate S Hearing, supra note 75, at 4 (statement of Glen A. Kohl, Tax
Legislative Counsel, Dept. of Treasury); see also STAFF, JOINT CoMM. ON TAXATION,
PREsENT LAW AND PROPOSALS RELATING TO SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS
AND HOME OFFICE DEDUCTIONS 5-6 (Comm. Print 1995) [hereinafter s CORP.
PROPOSALS].
77. See Robert J. Wells, S Corp. Simplification Bill To Be Introduced Soon, Senate
Aides Say, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY, 160-62 (1993).
78. Cf. S CORP. PROPOSALS, supra note 76, at 5 (noting that until rise of LLCs, S
corporations represented the only domestic business entity directly providing for one
level of tax and limited liability treatment under local law).
79. See id. at 2-3; supra note 75.
80. See Senate S Hearing, supra note 75, at 30-39 (interchange between senators
and witnesses, including author); id. at 50-54 (statement of Susan Hamill); supra note
75. The major advantages partnerships enjoy over S corporations - the ability to make
special allocations and to include shares of the entity's third party debt in the owner's
basis and the right to have any owner, including foreign persons - are not provided fo r
in either the 1995 proposal o r the 1996 legislation. Id.
.
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of 1995, new businesses will continue to choose the LLC in order to re
ceive the benefits of limited liability and one level of tax without hav
ing to deal with the restrictions of subchapter S or the complications as
sociated with paying out corporate profits in deductible items. Thus, the
corporate integration question with respect to sma1ler corporations will
not be answered by legislation that largely leaves the inequities between
S corporations and partnerships in place.81
Shortly after the hearing on S corporation reform, the Treasury As
sistant Secretary for Tax Policy suggested that the Senate Finance Com
mittee propose legislation a1lowing S corporations to convert to LLC
status without incurring the corporate tax, or a1low S corporations to
elect partnership taxation while retaining their corporate status under
state law.82 It is likely that most S corporations would choose to become
LLCs if a1lowed to do so tax free.83 Moreover, many eligible C corpora
tions would quickly elect subchapter S and convert to LLC status.84 A
mass conversion to LLC status led by tax considerations a1one would
further expose the tax inequities suffered by corporations caused by the
failure of lawmakers to address the corporate integration question.85 If
lawmakers a1low a11 S corporations to be taxed as partnerships without
giving up the corporate form, at least for closely held corporations eligi-

81 . See also infra notes 1 10-25 and accompanying text.
82. Letter from Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Treasury
Dept., to Orrin G. Hatch, Senator (July 25, 1 995), reprinted in Treasury Expresses Con
ditional Support for S Corp. Reform Bill, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY, 1 50-25 (Aug. 2,
1 995). The 1996 legislation contains no provision -allowing S corporations to convert to
partnerships or LLCs tax free or the general freedom to use the partnership tax provi
sions. See supra note 75.
83 . See Wells, supra note 77, at 1 00-02 (statement of Jerald August) (conceding
that businesses would opt for the LLC rather than the S corporation form if given a
choice and no transaction costs).
Total S corporations filing income tax returns equaled 1 ,785,371 in 1992. See S

Corporation Returns, STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Spring 1 995, at 73. Thus, a more
favorable tax rule would cause a mass migration to the LLC form. See also EMPIRICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF HOUSEHOLD TAXATION (Martin Feldstein & James M. Poterba

eds., (1996); JOEL SLEMROD, HIGH-INCOME FAMILIES AND THE TAX CHARGES OF
THE 1980s: THE ANATOMY OF BEHAVIORAL REsPONSE <JI 6.4.1 (1996) (noting that
choice of S corporations rose substantially after the Tax Reform Act of 1 986).
84. C corporations, which are subject to tax at the corporate level and again at the
shareholder level when the corporation pays dividends (the two-tier tax), include all
corporations that have not elected (or are ineligible to elect) to be S corporations. Be
cause S corporations can only have 35 shareholders (75 shareholders after the effective
date of the Small Business Protection Act of 1 996) and face numerous other restric
tions, most of the corporations in the United States of significant size will be C corpora
tions. See supra notes 7-8.
85. Cf. Senate S Hearings, supra note 75, at 24, 29 (statement of Martin Ginsburg,
Professor, Georgetown University Law Ctr.) (stating that S corporation reform is needed
to help existing corporations that cannot convert to an LLC).
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ble to elect subchapter S, the tax inequities demanding corporate inte
gration would disappear, and these businesses could choose between the
corporate and LLC forms for business reasons alone.86
II.
A.

LLCs AND CORPORATE INTEGRATION

Partnerships and Closely Held Corporations Enjoy One-Level
Taxation and Limited Liability
Long before the LLC emerged, some businesses sought to combine

the advantages of limited liability for all owners with one level of taxa
tion by forming a partnership with corporate intermediaries between the
ultimate partner and the partnership. Individual partners of general part
nerships that produce taxable income often use S corporations to bear
the personal liability for the partnership's obligations.87 The partner
ship's income flows through to the S corporation and then again to the
ultimate partner who thereby avoids bearing personal liability for the
partnership's debts.88
Over the years it has also become standard industry practice for
limited partnerships to acquire limited liability by using minimally capi
talized corporate general partners.89 As long as the partner seeking to
avoid personal liability takes precautions to ensure that no grounds exist
to pierce the corporate vei190 or otherwise disregard the corporation,91
the partnership effectively provides limited liability protection and one
level of tax. From the perspective of both general and limited partner
ships acquiring limited liability by using corporate partners, LLCs pro86. This would directly provide for corporate integration for the defined group of
corporations eligible to elect Subchapter S under a pure pass through to shareholders
modeled exactly like the partnership rules.
87. In 1992, 49.34% of the S corporations had only one shareholder. See S Corporation Returns, supra note 83, at 73.
88. See supra notes 6, 8.
89. See Hamill, supra note 61, at 585-87, 604-07.
90. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REv. 1 036 (1991 ) (extensive study of over 1 500 cases outlining the fac
tors various courts use to pierce the corporate veil). Professor Thompson notes that no
cases were found involving a widely held or publicly traded corporation's veil being
disregarded. Id. at 1 047.
91. See, e.g., Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. 1975)
(concluding that corporation was a mere fiction because its sole purpose was to manage
and control limited partnership); cf. Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc. 562
P.2d 244, 247 (Wash. 1 977) (concluding that because creditors relied on the corporate
partner as the party with general liability, limited partners who were also officers, direc
tors, or shareholders were not personally liable); see also Alan L. Feld, The "Control"
Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HAR.v. L. REv. 1 471 (1 969); Michael S. McNeely,
Note, Liability of a Limited Partner Who Is an Officer, Director, and Shareholder of a
Corporate Sole General Partner, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 997 (1 978).
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vide no new opportunities to enjoy limited liability. Rather, the LLC al
lows these businesses to enjoy limited liability without going through
the expense and effort of setting up intermediary corporations.
Many active closely held businesses that essentially operated like
general partnerships have chosen to incorporate directly rather than use
intermediary corporate partners in order to obtain limited liability pro
tection.92 Because the shareholders of these close corporations act, as a
business matter, more like general partners, problems arise when trying
to resolve disputes among the shareholders using strict corporate law.
Minority shareholders involved in disputes with the majority sharehold
ers face the possibility that their capital investment will grant no imme
diate return. Under the protection of the business judgment rule, corpo
rate law grants majority shareholders, as the controlling members of the
board of directors, wide discretion to withhold dividends and deny the
minority shareholders salary payments as employees. Unlike partners in
partnerships, shareholders of corporations generally have no right to
force the corporation or the other shareholders to buy back their
shares.93
Initially, courts rigidly applied the traditional corporate law and de
nied minority shareholders relief.94 Over time, courts95 and legislatures96

92. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
93. See generally 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 7.02 (2d ed. 1985).
94. See 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS §§ 8.13 and 8.14 (3d ed. 1990); see also Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel,
Inc., 60 N.E.2d 829 (N.Y. 1945); Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936); McQuade
v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934).
95. See Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing
fiduciary duties in close corporations under Illinois law); Evans v. Certified Engg. &
Testing Co., 834 F. Supp. 488 (D. Mass. 1993) (denying defendants motion for sum
mary judgment in part); Cramer v. Devon Group, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980) (remanding for a
factual determination of whether the remedy is appropriate); Van Schaack v. Van
Schaack Holdings, Ltd., 856 P.2d 15 (Colo. Ct App. 1992); Marshall v. W.E. Marshall
Co., 376 S.E.2d 393 (Ga Ct App. 1988); W&W Equip. Co., v. Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849 (Mass. 1988); Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); Donahue v. Rodd Elec
trotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975); Donahue v. Draper, 491
N.E.2d 260 (Mass. App. Ct 1986) (remanding for a new trial on the issue of appropri
ate damages); Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 385 N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. App. Ct 1979);
Westgor v. Grimm, 318 N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 1982) (remanding to determine if the actions
taken by the majority shareholders were in the interest of the corporation); Harris v.
Mardan Business Sys., Inc, 421 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing fiduci
ary duties, but finding that these parties are not co-shareholders bound by fiduciary du
ties); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (recognizing fiduci
ary duties in a close corporation context, but denying minority shareholder relief based
on failure of minority shareholder to sustain her burden of proof); Russell v. First York
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recognized the business differences between close corporations and
widely held corporations and started to fashion remedies for minority
shareholders in close corporations. The combination of state corporation
codes that allow opportunities to plan around close corporation
problems and the courts' recognition of special fiduciary duties owed to
minority shareholders, allowed the corporate form to become a serious
alternative for the closely held business.97
Sav. Co., 352 N.W.2d 871 (Neb. 1 984) (per curiam) (recognizing fiduciary duties, but
the action was barred by statute of limitations), overruled on other grounds by Van Pelt
v. Greenhouse, 364 N.W.2d 1 4 (Neb. 1 985); Yackel v. Kay, 642 N.E.2d 1 107 (Ohio
1994); Frank Lerner and Assocs., v. Vassy, 599 N.E.2d 734 (Ohio 1991); Crosby v.
Beam, 47 Ohio St. 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989); Thompson v. Central Ohio Cellular
Inc., 639 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1 994); Koos v. Central Ohio Cellular, Inc., 641
N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing fiduciary duties in the close corporation
context, but holding that defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties to minority
shareholders under these specific facts); Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992); Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980) (reversing sum
mary judgment and remanding for factual findings to determine if majority shareholder
conduct was oppressive).
96. Many states adopted close corporation supplements while others explicitly rec
ognized in their general corporate statute the right to enter into shareholder agreements
and petition the court for dissolution or buy-out due to oppression. See REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 7.32, 14.30 (1984); MODEL STATtrfORY CLOSE
CORP. SUPP. §§ 1-55 (1988), reprinted in MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT AN
NOTATED (3d ed. 1985); see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800 (West 1990); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1991).
97. During the period in which close corporation law developed, roughly the late
1970s through the mid-1980s, the number of general partnerships and corporations with
assets ranging from $1 to $1 million (small-asset corporations) increased. Each year
from 1977 until 1985, the number of general partnerships filing income tax returns
equaled 1 ,058,220; 1 , 1 15,247; 1,163,481; 1,209,31 8; 1 ,252,298; 1 ,288,326; 1,308,000;
1,386,417; and 1 ,433,725, respectively. See Partnership Returns, 1978-82, STAT. OF IN
COME BULL., Spring 1986, at 71; Partick Piet, Partnership Returns, 1983, STAT. OF
INCOME BULL., Summer 1985, at 55; Alan Zempel, Partnership Returns, 1984, at
STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Summer 1986 at 37; Alan Zempel, Partnership Returns,
1985, STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Summer 1987, at 33. From 1977 until 1985, the num
ber of small-asset corporations filing income tax returns equaled 2,008,305; 2,1 12,167;
2,273,302; 2,405,227; 2,459,353; 2,570,557; 2,629,788; 2,757,179; and 2,844,212, re
spectively. See STATISTICS OF INCOME Div.. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATIS
TICS OF INCOME: 1977-1985 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS (each year in
separate books).
After 1985 the number of general partnerships filing returns steadily declined.
From 1986 until 1993, general partnerships totaled 1 ,429,876; 1,385,824; 1 ,369,093;
1,341,527; 1,267,760; 1,244,665; 1 ,214,004; and 1,175,189, respectively. See Alan
Zempel, Partnership Returns, 1986, STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Summer 1988, at 29, 3 1
fig. D ; Joseph H . Middough, Partnership Returns, 1987, STAT. O F INCOME BULL.,
Wmter 1989-1990, at 5, 7 fig. B; Gail Moglen, Partnership Returns 1988, STAT OF IN
COME BULL., Summer 1990, at 5, 5 fig. A. Except for a tiny decline in filings from
1987 to 1988, small-asset corporations increased every year from 1985 to 1992 (show
ing 2,844,212; 2,916,891; 3,016,254; 3,012,174; 3,064,603; 3,152,534; 3,228,881; and
3,258,995 corporations filing income tax returns in those years, respectively). See STA-
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These closely held corporations, while developing their own part
nership-flavored corporate law, have been able largely to avoid the cor
porate tax.98 During the period between 1970 and 1986, the year Con
gress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1986, closely held corporations,99
on a percentage basis, paid a negligible amount of corporate tax when
compared to the total receipts realized by corporations.100 For example,
in 1976 corporations with assets of less than $ 1 million (small-asset
corporations) earned 17.8% of the total receipts realized by all corpora
tions but paid only 4.86% of the total corporate tax paid by all
corporations. 101
The percentage of corporate tax paid appears even more insignifi
cant when focusing only on the small-asset corporations with the lowest
asset base. For example, in 1976 corporations with assets of less than

$100,000 paid only 0.57% of the total corporate tax while realizing
3.83% of the total receipts.102 In 1986, these small-asset corporations
paid slightly more tax but hardly shouldered a share commensurate with

TISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV STATISTICS OF INCOME:
1985-1992 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETuRNs (each year in separate books).
These trends suggest that, by the mid-1980s, existing smaller businesses were incorpo
rating and new smaller businesses were more often choosing to be corporations rather
than general partnerships.
98. See supra notes 92-97 and infra notes 99-125 and accompanying text.
99. Because the Statistics of Income on Corporations reflects a corporation's size
by the value of its assets (on a gross rather than net basis, see infra note 122) rather
than the number of shareholders, it is assumed that small-asset corporations roughly en
compasses corporations with relatively few shareholders. See STATISTICS OF INCOME
DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1970-1991 CORPORA
TION INCOME TAX RETuRNs (each year in separate books); STAT. OF INCOME BULL.
Fall & Spring 1995; see also infra note 110 (describing the tiny number of small-asset
corporations that list as publicly traded on the over the counter markets).
100. Smaller firms in competitive industries generally have a lower rate of return
than larger firms, monopolies, and oligopolies. While some of the lower tax to total re
ceipts ratio for smaller firms might be explained by the lower rates of return generally
earned by smaller firms, undoubtedly a large part of the discrepancy is due to the
smaller firms' methods of avoiding the corporate tax. See infra notes 110-26 and ac
companying text.
101. See STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS
OF INCOME: 1976 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS [hereinafter STATISTICS
OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 1976]. These figures assume that the corporations have
at least $1 of assets.
Corporations with assets of $1 million or more but less than $5 million, a group
with assets too large to fit comfortably in the small-asset group, likewise managed to
avoid a large amount of corporate tax, although their contribution to the total corporate
revenues cannot be categorically classified as insignificant or negligible. In 1976 these
in between corporations paid 6.72% of the corporate tax while realizing 12.19% of the
total receipts. Id.
102. See id. This assumes that the corporations in question have at least $1 of
assets.
.•
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their earnings. In that year, these corporations realized 14.26% of gross
receipts but paid only 4.65% of the corporate tax.103 In 1986 small-asset
corporations with assets below $100,000 realized 3.3 1 % of total re
ceipts but paid only 0.70% of the corporate tax.104
Since 1987 small-asset corporations on the whole decreased their
share of the corporate tax every year.105 In 1987 small-asset corpora
tions realized 13.52% of total receipts and paid only 3.68% of the cor
porate tax;106 small-asset corporations with assets below $100,000 real
ized 3.18% of the total receipts and paid 0.51% of the corporate tax.107
By 1992 small-asset corporations realized 1 1.94% of total receipts and
paid only 2.0% of the corporate tax; 1 08 small-asset corporations with
103. STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF
INCOME: 1986 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETuRNS [hereinafter STATISTICS OF
INCOME, CoRPORATIONS, 1986]. These figures assume that the corporations have at
least $1 of assets. Corporations with assets of $1 million to $5 million likewise man
aged to avoid a large amount of corporate

tax, although their contribution to the total

corporate revenues cannot be categorically classified as insignificant or negligible. In
1986 these corporations paid 5.93% of the corporate tax while realizing 11.37% of the
total receipts. Id.
104. See id. These figures assume that the corporations have at least $1 of assets.
105. Small-asset corporations in 1987 bore less corporate tax than they did in

1986. The gap between the percentage of total receipts and percentage of corporate tax
paid in 1986 equaled 9.61 % (2.61% when focusing only on the corporations with assets
of less than $100,000), while this spread totaled 9.84% in 1987 (2.67% when focusing
only on the corporations with assets of less than $100,000). Comparing the 1986 and
1987 figures, the increased differential suggests that small-asset corporations more suc
cessfully avoided the corporate tax in 1987. Id.; STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., INTER
NAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1987 CORPORATION INCOME TAX
RETuRNS [hereinafter STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 1987].
From 1988 all the way through 1992, small-asset corporations paid a steadily de
creasing share of the corporate tax when focusing on the percentage of their total re
ceipts compared to the percentage of their total corporate tax paid. In 1988 these corpo
rations realized 12.85% of total receipts and paid 2.59% of the corporate tax; in 1989
they realized 12.15% of total receipts and paid 2.55% of the corporate tax; in 1990 they
realized 12.15% of total receipts and paid 2.27% of the corporate tax; in 1991 they real
ized 12.08% of total receipts and paid 2.20% of the corporate tax; in 1992 they realized
11.94% of total receipts and paid 2.0% of the corporate tax. See id; STATISTICS OF IN

COME DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1988-1992 COR·
PORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS (each year in separate volumes).
The latest year in which statistics on corporate income
is 1992. See supra note 99; infra note 109.

tax returns were published

106. STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 1987, supra note 105. These
figures assume that the corporations have at least $1 of assets.
In between corporations with assets of $1 million or more but less than $5 million
managed to avoid a large amount of corporate tax, although their contribution to the to
tal corporate revenues cannot be categorically classified as insignificant or negligible. In

1987 these corporations paid 4.47% of the corporate
total receipts. See id.

tax while realizing 10.80% of the

107. See id.
108. These figures assume that the corporations have at least $1 of assets.
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less than $ 100,000 of assets realized 3 .10% of total receipts but paid
only 0.28% of the corporate tax.109
To avoid the entity-level tax, closely held corporations frequently
extract the profits out of corporate solution by directly or indirectly
making deductible payments to shareholders. 1 1 0 The IRS has often at
tacked this technique and attempted to recoup the corporate tax by
recharacterizing these payments as dividends. Although since the mid1930s the IRS has sought to reclassify a variety of payments (such as
compensation, rent, and interest as dividends) in nearly 400 cases, 1 1 1 it

In between corporations with assets of $1 million to $5 million managed to avoid a
large amount of corporate tax, although their contribution to the total corporate revenues
cannot be categorically classified as insignificant or negligible. In 1992, these corpora
tions paid 2.82% of the corporate tax while realizing 10.30% of the total receipts. STAT.
OF INCOME BULL., Fall/Spring 1995, 7-25 (coverage includes corporate return statis
tics). Like small-asset corporations, these in between corporations were paying notice
ably less corporate tax by 1992 than they paid in the previous years, indicating that they
were finding more deductible expenses at the corporate level. See supra notes 101, 103,
106.
109. See STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS,
1 992, supra note 58. The gap between small-asset corporations' percentage of total re
ceipts and percentage of corporate tax paid in 1992 equaled 9.94% (2.82% when focus
ing only on the corporations with assets of less than $100,000). Comparing the 1992
figures with the 1986 figures, 9.61 % (2.61 % for the less than $ 100,000 corporations),
and the 1987 figures, 9.84% (2.67% for the less than $100,000 corporations), clearly
proves that small-asset corporations steadily increased their ability to avoid the corpo
rate tax by 1 992. See also STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 1986. supra note
103, at 8; STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 198�. supra note 105, at 8.
1 10. Most of the corporations in the small-asset group are probably closely held.
However a few of these corporations do trade publicly. In 1992, 3,258,995 small-asset
corporations filed income tax returns. See STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS,
1 992, supra note 58. Currently 8079 corporations in this asset range are publicly traded.
Search of LEXIS, Compny library, UPSPUB file (Mar. 21, 1996) (search = total - assets
(< $1 ,000,000)). Although the number of corporations currently trading is not a perfect
comparison to the total returns in 1992, it roughly indicates that a very limited number
of small-asset corporations publicly trade. The publicly traded corporations in this group
are most likely post bankruptcy shells of what once was a profitable company. These
companies have outstanding stock, little assets, no income, and probably substantial net
operating losses. More than likely these companies pay no corporate taxes.
1 1 1 . Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, MEGA file (Oct 24, 1995) (search = cor
poration and (stockholder! or shareholder! or (control! /5 corporation)) and (deduct! /50
salar! or rent or interest or compensation) and ((disguis! or constructiv!) /5 dividend!)
and (23 or 162 or 163 or 1.162 or 1 .163 or (ordinary or necessary /5 business expens!))
(599 cases found); Search of LEXIS, Taxria library, CASES file (Oct. 24, 1995) (same
search parameters) (575 cases found); Search of Westlaw, Allcases and FTX-CS
databases (Oct. 25, 1995) (same search parameters) (53 1 and 533 cases found, respec
tively). After overlapping cases were eliminated, these combined searches produced a
total of 610 net cases of which 381 involved payments potentially being recharacterized
as dividends. Of the 381 cases, the Service entirely prevailed in 123 cases, entirely lost
95 cases, and was able to partially, but not completely, recharacterize the deductible
payment as a dividend in 163 cases. See also Hamill, supra note 61, at 603 n.171 (a
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won only 123 of them.112 In all the other cases, the corporation was able
to keep its deduction at least partially, and often completely, thus effec
tively eliminating the corporate tax.113 During the 1970s through the
mid-1980s, the IRS litigated 179 cases and won only 30 percent of the
time.114 By the end of the 1 970s, the IRS publicly announced that it
would no longer seek to recharacterize compensation payments as divi
dends, even if the corporation paid virtually no dividends, if the com
pensation payments met the standard for reasonableness.1 15 From 1 985
through 1995, the IRS cut down the number of cases litigated and im
proved its success record, prevailing in 45% of 8 1 cases.116
The IR.S's inability to effectively prevent closely held corporations
from avoiding the corporate tax becomes even more obvious after ex
amining the cases when the IRS either completely or partially com
pelled a dividend. In many of these cases, the corporation could have
preserved the deduction entirely or largely had it been better advised.
For example, better planning (advising the shareholder to actually per
form meaningful services and keep good records) could have altered the
result in cases in which the IRS invalidated a salary deduction, because
the shareholder either performed inadequate services for the corpora
tion1 17 or none at all.1 18 Moreover, the IRS successfully disallowed other

more limited search in the Taxria library produced 260 annotated cases, with the Ser
vice completely prevailing in 72 cases, entirely losing in 138 cases, and partially
recharacterizing dividends in 50 cases).
1 12. See supra note 1 1 1 and infra notes 1 1 6-20, 1 24 and accompanying text. The
IRS undoubtedly audited and settled many more cases, the number of which is impossi
ble to estimate.
1 13. See supra note 1 1 1 .
1 1 4. See supra note 1 1 1 . From 1 970 t o 1984, of the 179 litigated cases, the IRS
won 51 cases, lost 49 cases, and had partial success in 79 cases.
1 15. See Rev. Rul. 79-8, 1 979-1 C.B. 92. In Charles McCandless 1ile Serv. v.
United States, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1 970), the court ordered a constructive dividend
reflecting 15% of the corporation's profit even though the salary paid by the corporation
fell within the standard of reasonableness. After several other courts disagreed with this
reasoning, the Service retreated from the Court of Claims' position.
1 1 6. See supra note 1 1 1 . Of the 1 22 early cases (from 1 935 to 1965), the IRS only
won 29% of the time (35 cases). From 1 985 to 1 995, of the 81 litigatec1 cases, the Ser
vice won 37 cases, lost 15 cases, and enjoyed partial success in 29 cases.
1 17. Of the 286 cases in which the IRS was either partially or completely success
ful, 48 involved situations in which the shareholder's salary was too large when consid
ering the work done and therefore failed to meet the standards of reasonableness. See
supra note 1 1 1 . For example, in order for the salary paid to the shareholder to be en
tirely deductible, it had to be reasonable in comparison to other salaries paid in the in
dustry for comparable positions. Courts also considered the shareholder's contribution
(or lack thereof) to the corporation's success. See supra note 1 1 1.
1 1 8. See Hardin v. United States, 461 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1 972); Union Stock
Farms v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 7 1 2 (9th Cir. 1 959); Fink v. Wallace (In re Fink), No.
CV 1 85-51 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 1 0, 1 986); S.A. Manohara, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, 68
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salary and rent deductions, because the shareholders failed to ade
quately document the business nature of the expense - a mistake
clearly avoidable with competent advice.1 19 In other cases, the IRS suc
cessfully denied the corporate interest deduction because the sharehold
ers failed to adequately document the debtor-creditor relationship with
the corporation.120
Both the statistics on corporate income tax filings121 and the cases
in which the IRS attempted to recharacterize deductible payments as
dividends illustrate that closely held corporations were able to avoid the
corporate tax almost completely. Small-asset corporations did indeed
pay a negligible amount of corporate tax

-

certainly not enough to

make a positive impact on corporate revenues.122 Although over time

T.C.M. (CCH) 142 (1994); Alexander Shokai, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH)
1 870 (1992); Greenwood v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1058 (1989); Frankland
Racing Equip., Inc. v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 658 (1987); Estate of Marcello
v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1408 (1977); American Lithofold Corp. v. Commis
sioner, 55 T.C. 904 (1971), acq., 1971-2 C.B.1; Miles Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 28
T.C.M. (CCH) 1387 (1969); Mulder Bros. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 217
(1967); Glasgow Village Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 691 (1961), acq., 196122 C.B. 4, and acq., 1 962-2 C.B.6; Wilson v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 676
(1961) (13 total cases).
1 19. Of the 286 cases, 52 of them involved corporations that could have largely
salvaged the deduction had the shareholders documented the business nature and other
details of the expense. See supra note 1 1 1.
120. Of the 286 cases in which the IRS enjoyed partial or total success, 12 could
have preserved the interest deduction had the shareholders simply bothered to set forth
a note with an interest rate. See supra note 1 1 1.
121. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text. In 1976, small-asset corpora
tions paid $4,047,500,000 in corporate tax revenues compared to $70,503,361 ,000 of
tax paid by larger corporations. By 1986, the small-asset corporate tax bill had risen to
$5,157,474,000 with the larger corporations picking up $102,682,896,000 in corporate
tax revenues. In 1987 the small-asset corporations' total tax paid dropped to
$4,349,478,000 while the larger corporations continued to pay more, $1 12,354,765,000
that year. By 1992, small-asset corporate tax revenues further decreased to
$2,638,015,000, while larger corporations' tax revenue continued to grow to
$127,218,877,000 that year. See STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 1 976,
1986, 1987, 1992 supra notes 101, 103, 105, 58, respectively. Because the asset size
measures gross rather than net assets, the corporate tax paid by truly small corporations
probably appears to be more than it is actually. Some corporations, by virtue of having
less liabilities on a percentage basis when compared to other corporations, appear (when
measuring gross assets) to be smaller than they are. If it were possible to group all cor
porations by size according to their net assets, corporations with less liabilities will ap
pear in a larger sized group. It is impossible to tell how many of the small-asset corpo
rations in the less than $1 million gross asset group have proportionally less liabilities
and therefore should be in a larger asset group. One can speculate that the bulk of the
small-asset corporations paying the corporate tax are lean with little leverage and there
fore would appear in a larger asset group if the corporations could be grouped accord
ing to net rather than gross assets. See infra notes 131 and 145.
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the IRS improved its chances of recouping some tax through litigation,
at best its total success rate rose to just under 50%

-

not enough to

justify litigation costs when compared to the corporate tax recouped.123
Moreover, in more than half of the cases where the IRS enjoyed partial
or complete success, the corporation again could have largely preserved
its deduction had the shareholders sought competent advice.124 Further
more, the corporate income tax return filings from 1987 to 1992 (the
period during which the IRS 's record improved) show that closely held
corporations further reduced their share of the corporate tax.125 Because
closely held corporations of a relatively modest asset size never were
and never will be a serious source of corporate tax revenues,126 the in
creased use of the LLC form rather than the closely held corporation
imposes little or no threat to corporate tax revenues and, therefore, does
not represent an unsanctioned backdoor to corporate integration.
B.

Is There an LLC Challenge to Larger Corporations?

As corporations grow beyond a closely held group of shareholders,
it becomes increasingly difficult for a variety of reasons to eliminate the
corporate tax. For example, once the number of shareholders grows be
yond a closely held group, the board of directors faces business pres-

123. See supra note 1 1 1 and accompanying text. Arguably, a tough litigating posi
tion by the IRS might discourage more abusive corporate deductible payments that are
disguised as dividends. However, a well-advised closely held corporation can still
largely avoid the corporate tax without prompting an IRS attack.
124. See supra note 1 1 1 . Of the 286 cases in which the IRS enjoyed partial or to
tal success, in 1 80 the IRS's victory can be best viewed as the result of a shareholder's
blunder, either from poor planning or from outright illegal or fraudulent activity. See
supra notes 1 17-20.
125. See supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text.
126. Over the last 10 to 20 years, the mix of corporate income earned has shifted
away from capital-intensive businesses that will show a greater value in assets (particu
larly when the measurement focuses on gross rather than net assets, see supra note 122
and infra note 131) toward more service-oriented, highly technical businesses - Silicon
Valley, for example - that will show a much smaller value when measuring assets. In
these service companies, the stock value will be a more accurate v aluation of the com
pany than the total assets and if it were possible to group all corporations by size ac
cording to stock value, these technical service oriented corporations would appear in a
larger-sized group. Undoubtedly a good portion of the corporate tax paid by the smaller
companies, when measuring size based on assets, comes from these service corporations
that appear in a smaller-sized group than they should. If in the future the amount of cor
porate tax paid by smaller (measuring assets) corporations increases, that increase can
probably be largely attributed to further growth in these highly technological, service
oriented industries that in fact should be treated as larger corporations. The presence of
these new service-oriented corporations in no way undermines the ability of traditional
closely held corporations, in fact truly small corporations, to avoid the corporate
paying out corporate earnings in deductible items.

tax by
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sures to declare at least some dividends.127 Moreover, once a corpora
tion's assets and total receipts grow beyond a certain range, it becomes
increasingly difficult to eliminate its taxable income with legitimate
business deductions. The main tool to mitigate the corporate tax that is
available to corporations beyond the closely held range involves using
debt to raise capital (which creates deductible interest) rather than
building equity (which creates nondeductible dividends).128 The IRS has
sometimes challenged the interest or other corporate deductions of
larger corporations but has enjoyed no more success in preserving the
corporate tax than it did in its attempts to disallow deductions of closely

held corporations. 1w

Despite the opportunity to mitigate the corporate tax by creating
corporate debt, the largest corporations, representing the greatest con
centration of publicly traded corporations, pay the lion's share of the
corporate tax1 30 on a percentage basis when compared to their total re-

127. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 93, at § 1 .02.
128. Section 163(a) generally allows corporations to deduct interest on indebted
ness. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (1994). Because dividends paid on stock are not deductible,
corporations will often prefer to issue debt instead of equity when raising capital. Al
though § 279 might appear to disallow interest deductions on certain debt incurred to
acquire another corporation, see I.R.C. § 279 (1994), a closer look reveals a number of
easy opportunities to avoid the limitations. Consequently, corporations could generally
deduct all interest on debt needed to finance the takeover boom in the 1980s. After an
aborted attempt in 1987 to cut back the corporate interest deduction, see H.R. 3545,
l OOth Cong. §§ 10138, 10144 (1987), in 1989 Congress finally passed some limitations
narrowly targeted to cover very specific abuses, see Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, §§ 7202(a)-(b), 721 l (a)-(b), 101 Stat 2301, 2330-32, 234245 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 163(e)(5), (i), 172(b)(l)(E), (h) (1994)). Although
these changes represent a start toward limiting the benefits of corporate leverage, the
current tax system still significantly favors corporate debt over corporate equity. See
BIITKER & EUSTICE, supra note 7, 'lBI 4.01 [2] and 4.26 (1995).
A comprehensive discussion of the disparate treatment of corporate interest and
dividend payments and how it complicates the corporate integration issue is beyond the
scope of this article. See generally Cheryl D. Block, The Trouble with Interest: Reflec
tions on Interest Deductions After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 40 U. FLA. L. REv. 689
(1988); Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction
Discourages Innovation and Risk-Taking, 38 Vn..L. L. REv. 1461 (1993); Alvin C. War
ren, Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE LJ. 1585
(1984).
129. See supra note 1 1 1. The facts in approximately 69 cases strongly suggested
that the corporation was not closely held. In most of the 52 cases in this group in which
the IRS enjoyed partial or total success, the corporation had attempted to deduct per
sonal or other nonbusiness expenses.
130. The tax revenues collected from corporations as a percentage of total federal
revenues collected from all taxpayers has been falling. In 1943 the corporate tax made
up 39.8% of all federal revenues while by 1991 corporations shouldered just under 9%
of all federal revenues. See BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 7, <JI 1 .0 1 . To the extent
that corporations steadily contribute less on a percentage basis to federal revenue as a
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ceipts.131 In 1 976 corporations with assets of $250 million or more
(large-asset corporations) realized 46.18% of total receipts while paying
66.94% of the total corporate tax.132 In 1 986 large-asset corporations
slightly reduced their percentage share of the corporate tax, realizing
50.49% of total receipts while paying 64.48% of the corporate tax.133
Since 1 987 the percentage of corporate tax paid by large-asset corpora
tions representing the bulk of the publicly traded corporations has
grown consistently each year;134 in that year, large-asset corporations
earned 5 1 .94% of the total receipts but paid 7 1 .63% of the corporate

whole, the LLC's possible impact on the corporate tax and the corporate integration
question generally becomes less controversial.
131. Because the Statistics of Income breaks down corporations only by asset size,
this analysis assumes that the corporations with assets of $250 million or more {large
asset corporations) tend to be publicly traded. The measurement of a corporation's asset
size focuses on gross rather than net assets, which is the figure used to group corpora
tions for SOI purposes. Because gross asset size includes liabilities, highly leveraged
corporations will appear to be larger than they are in actuality. Because earnings and
taxes are related more closely to net assets, the grouping of corporations by gross assets
produces a larger margin of error.
In 1992, 6269 large-asset corporations filed income tax returns. See STATISTICS
OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 1992, supra note 58. Currently, 3634 large-asset corpo
rations are publicly traded. See Search of LEXIS, Compny library, USPUB file, (Mar.
21, 1996) (search
total - assets ( > $249,999,999)). Although the current number of
publicly traded corporations and the total 1992 income tax return filings is not a perfect
comparison, together they roughly indicate that more than 50% of the largest corpora
tions are publicly traded, a percentage far greater than any other asset range of corpora
tions. Although the percentage of publicly traded large-asset corporations seems low,
one can assume that the nonpublicly traded corporations in the large-asset group are
highly leveraged. From a perspective of measuring gross assets these companies appear
larger than they are because of a high number of liabilities and would likely appear in
the medium-asset corporate group if it were possible to group the corporations accord
ing to size on a net asset basis. See supra note 1 10; infra note 145.
132. The total tax paid by these corporations equaled $55,758,037,000. STATIS
TICS OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 1976, supra note 101.
133. See STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 1986, supra note 103. The
total tax paid by large-asset corporations equaled $71 ,660,623,000.
134. See supra note 131. Large-asset corporations in 1987 appeared to bear more
corporate tax than they did in 1986. The gap between the percentage of corporate tax
paid and the percentage of total receipts in 1986 equaled 13.90%, while this gap rose to
19.69% in 1987. Comparing the 1986 and 1987 figures, the increased differential indi
cates that large-asset corporations, presumably publicly traded, increasingly shouldered
a greater share of the corporate tax. See STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS,
1987, supra note 105; see also STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 1986, supra
note 103. Moreover, large-asset corporations in 1992 bear even more corporate tax than
they did in 1987. The gap between the percentage of corporate tax paid and the percent
age of total receipts in 1987 equaled 19.69%, while this gap rose to 23.24% in 1992.
Comparing the 1987 and 1992 figures, the increased differential proves that the bulk of
the corporate tax is paid by, and will continue to be paid by, large-asset corporations.
See id.; STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 1987, supra note 105.
=
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tax. 135 By 1992 they realized 55.22% of the total receipts and paid
78.46% of the corporate tax. 1 36 Because the tax law requires all publicly
traded partnerships, 1 37 which include publicly traded LLCs, to bear the
corporate tax, publicly traded LLCs cannot possibly undermine the cor
porate tax base. 1 38 Consequently, the increased use of LLCs does not di
rectly force lawmakers to decide the important policy question of
whether publicly traded corporations should enjoy some form of corpo
rate integration. 1 39
Corporations with assets well above the range of small-asset cor
porations but not reaching the size of large-asset corporations 1 40 consist-

135. See STATISTICS OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 1987,
total tax paid equaled $84,871,153,000.

supra note 105. The

136. The total tax paid equaled $103,006,310,000. See STATISTICS OF INCOME,
CORPORATIONS, 1992, supra note 58. The large-asset corporations paid slightly less
tax in 1989 when compared to 1988. (In 1988 they paid 76.45% of the corporate tax
and they realized 52.36% of the total receipts; in 1989 they paid 76.02% of the corpo
rate tax and realized 53.34% of the total receipts; the drop in tax paid from 1988 to
1989 was an insignificant less than one-half of one percent). After 1989 the large-asset
corporations paid a slightly increasing share of the corporate tax each year. In 1990 they
paid 77.58% of the corporate tax and realized 54.12% of the total receipts; in 1991 they
paid 77.69% of the corporate tax and realized 54.82% of the total receipts; in 1992 they
paid 78.46% of the corporate tax and realized 55.22% of the total receipts.
137. See I.R.C.§ 7704(b) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1 .7704-1 (1995). Publicly traded
partnerships include any partnership interest traded on an established market, a secon
dary market, or the equivalent The regulations contain safe harbors deeming certain
sales of partnership interests that constitute private transfers or private placements, sales
pursuant to certain redemption and repurchase agreements, and sales pursuant to certain
qualified matching services to fall outside the definition of public trading. See Treas.
Reg.§ 1 .7704-1 (1995).
138. Theoretically, LLCs could undermine the corporate tax paid by the large
asset corporations that are not publicly traded. On a practical level, under the current in
come tax system LLCs possess no more ability to replace nonpublicly traded large-asset
corporations than they do in the $10 million to $250 million asset range (medium-asset
corporations). Because LLCs pose no practical threat to the corporate tax raised by the
nonpublicly traded corporations in the medium-asset range, LLCs cannot possibly
threaten the corporate tax paid by the large-asset nonpublicly traded corporations. See
infra notes 148-70 and accompanying text
139. See supra note 19; see also RICHARD GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME
TAX (1951); RICHARD B. GOODE, THE POSTWAR CORPORATION TAX STRUCTURE

(1946); CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TwicE?
(1979). The question whether LLCs would have the ability to undermine the corporate
tax if the tax law allowed them to publicly trade while enjoying partnership taxation (as
was indeed permitted before Congress enacted § 7704 in 1987 taxing publicly traded
partnerships as corporations) is beyond the scope of this article. The debate relevant to
publicly traded LLCs would be identical to the debate on whether publicly traded part
nerships could undermine the corporate tax.
text

See infra notes 166-71 and accompanying

140. The data examining the corporate tax paid by corporations in the in between
asset group of $5 million to just under $10 million (too large to fit in the small-asset
group but too small to fit comfortably in the medium-asset group), show significantly
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ently pay roughly their share of the corporate tax on a percentage basis.
For example, in 1 976 corporations with assets of $ 1 0 million to just
under $250 million (medium-asset corporations) realized 1 6.98% of to
tal receipts and paid 1 4.32% of the corporate tax, 1 41 and in 1 986 these
corporations realized 17.33% of total receipts and paid 1 8.87% of the
corporate tax. 142 In 1987 data indicate a shift in favor of slightly less
corporate tax on a percentage basis, showing medium-asset corporations
realizing 17.10% of total receipts while paying 16.28% of the corporate
tax; 143 and by 1992 this gap had widened slightly more, with medium
asset corporations realizing 1 6.90% of total receipts and paying 1 4.02%
of the corporate tax. 144 Unlike large-asset corporations, which pay a sig
nificantly higher percentage of the corporate tax when compared to
their percentage of the total receipts, medium-asset corporations pay
close to the same percentage of corporate taxes.145 Although starting in
less total receipts and corporate tax paid than the data for the medium-asset and large
asset corporations; nevertheless in the earlier years they roughly paid their share of the
corporate tax. In 1976, corporations with $5 million to just under $10 million of assets
paid 3.21 % of the corporate tax while realizing 4.19% of the total receipts. See STATIS
TICS OF INCOME. CORPORATIONS, 1976, supra note 101. In 1986, these corporations
paid 3.1 1 % of the corporate tax while realizing 4.56% of the total receipts. See STATIS
TICS OF INCOME, CORPORATIONS, 1986, supra note 103.
By 1987, these in between corporations did a better job improving their corporate
tax position on a percentage basis than the corporations in the medium-asset range. In
1987 corporations with $5 million to just under $10 million of assets paid 2.45% of the
corporate tax while realizing 4.69% of the total receipts. See STATISTICS OF INCOME,
CORPORATIONS, 1987, supra note 1 05. By 1992 these corporations paid 1 .60% of the
corporate tax while realizing 4.39% of the total receipts. See STATISTICS OF INCOME,
CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS, 1992, supra note 58. Although these in be
tween corporations falling just below the medium-asset range generate far less total re
ceipts and corporate tax than medium-asset corporations and on a percentage basis do a
better job avoiding the corporate tax, their contribution to the total corporate revenues
cannot be categorically classified as insignificant or negligible. See supra notes 101,
103, 106 and 108.
141. Total tax paid equaled $14,745,324,000. See STATISTICS OF INCOME, COR
PORATIONS, 1976, supra note 101.
142. Total tax paid equaled $20,977,655,000. See STATISTICS OF INCOME, COR
PORATIONS, 1986, supra note 1 03.
143. Total tax paid equaled $19,282,358,000. See STATISTICS OF INCOME, COR·
PORATIONS, 1987, supra note 105.
144. Total tax paid equaled $1 8,41 1,714,000. See STATISTICS OF INCOME, COR
PORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS, 1992, supra note 58.
145. The number of publicly traded medium-asset corporations is far fewer than
the number of the publicly traded large-asset corporations. In 1992, 49,644 corporations
in the medium-asset range filed income tax returns. See STATISTICS OF INCOME, COR
PORATIONS, 1992, supra note 58. Currently, 5,275 medium-asset corporations are pub
licly traded. This is approximately 10.6% of the total 1992 corporations in the medium
asset range. See Search of LEXIS, Compny library, USPUB file (Mar. 21, 1996) (search
total -assets (< $250,000,000 and > $9,999,999)). Although the information on cur
rently publicly traded corporations is not a perfect comparison with that contained in
=
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1987 medium-asset corporations, like the smaller corporations, demon
strated an ability to improve their corporate tax position, medium-asset
corporations always have and, assuming no integration, probably always
will constitute an important source of revenue generated by the corpo
rate tax.
Unlike large-asset corporations, which represent the greatest con
centration of publicly traded activity , medium-asset corporations fall
into a variety of groups. Undoubtedly some of these corporations, par
ticularly those at the high end of the asset range, trade on the over-the
counter markets.146 The presence of the LLC as an alternative form can
not undermine the corporate tax raised by the publicly traded corpora
tions in this, or any, asset base because a publicly traded LLC will be
taxed as a corporation regardless of whether or not it technically quali
fies for partnership classification.147 However, to the extent that me
dium-asset corporations fall outside the definition of "publicly traded,"
the option of using the LLC form theoretically could undermine a sig
nificant source of corporate tax.148
For purely practical reasons, however, the LLC option poses no
real threat to tax revenue generated by nonpublicly traded corporations.
These corporations, like all others, are locked into the corporate form.
Existing corporations cannot liquidate and reform as LLCs, because the
corporate tax structure, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
imposes a corporate tax on all gains from liquidation and separately
taxes the shareholders on their receipt of the liquidation proceeds.149
The high cost of converting to the LLC form effectively locks all ex
isting corporations into paying the corporate tax, allowing larger corpo-

the total income tax filings in 1992 for the medium-asset range, it roughly indicates that
the medium-asset corporations on a percentage basis publicly trade far less often than
the large-asset corporations. One can assume that the medium-asset corporations that do
publicly trade are probably less leveraged than the average corporation in that group.
Consequently, if the asset size could be grouped according to net rather than gross as
sets, at least some of these corporations would probably be in the large-asset category.
See supra notes 122, 126 and 131.
146. See supra note 1 45.
147. See supra note 137.
148. To the extent that the large-asset corporations are not publicly traded, the op
tion of using an LLC could theoretically undermine the corporate tax collected from
these corporations. See supra note 131. The option of using a limited partnership can
also theoretically undermine the corporate tax. See infra notes 162-65. Whether the
LLC or limited partnership would be chosen is largely a business issue and beyond the
scope of this article.
149. See supra text accompanying note 7; see also JOINT COMM. ON TAXN.,
99TH CONG., !ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TIIE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1986, at 328-54 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter 1986 REFORM EXPLANATION].
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rations only the ability to mitigate the tax by, for example, raising capi
tal with debt instead of equity or by retaining eamings.150
Arguably, though, the existence of the LLC could erode the future
corporate tax of businesses that begin as small partnerships or LLCs
and subsequently enter the capital markets in order to grow rapidly.
Once these businesses reach a size commensurate with the nonpublicly
traded corporations currently paying significant corporate tax, 151 they
could simply choose not to convert into corporate form and could
thereby continue enjoying one level of tax under the partnership provi
sions. If the majority of these businesses do indeed avoid the corporate
tax by failing to convert to the corporate form once the size of the busi
ness shows promise for significant growth, the availability of the LLC
form over the long term would in fact contribute to an erosion of the
corporate tax base.1s2
However, the business tax system itself contains a practical back
stop that will force such businesses to enter into the corporate form
before they grow to a significant size. Once a small business reaches a
high growth stage, it becomes necessary to issue equity in substantial
amounts in order to raise capital. Because at this stage of a business'
development, management will want to reinvest excess cash in the busi
ness rather than pay immediate investment returns, the business will
want to issue equity (in which case management has sole discretion to
decide when returns are paid) rather than debt (which typically requires
regular interest payments).153 Currently, tax-exempt and foreign inves150. See id. at 328-55. The high tax cost of liquidating a corporation also pre
vented publicly traded corporations from converting the entire business to a publicly
traded partnership. See generally Master Limited Partnerships: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, l OOth
Cong. (1987) [hereinafter MLP Hearings].
151. An initial public offering of equity will cause the LLC to be taxed as a cor
poration under the publicly traded partnership rules. See supra note 137 and accompa
nying text However, growing businesses can and often do tap the capital markets
through private placements.
152. A small business starting out unincorporated currently can use the limited
partnership instead of the LLC once it reaches a level of growth where capital must be
raised in the market If the LLC poses a threat to the corporate tax paid by these busi
nesses avoiding the corporate form, the limited partnership poses the same threat. The
same practical problems that will confine the LLC to a mere theoretical threat to this
corporate tax also prevents limited partnerships from undermining the corporate tax. See
infra notes 153-65 and accompanying text.
153. See WILLIAM A KLEIN & JOHN c. COFFEE, JR.. BUSINESS ORGANIZA
TION AND FINANCE 365-80 (6th ed., 1996) for a discussion of considerations when
management adopts dividend policies; id. at 323-65 for a general discussion of leverage
and the choice of capital structure; id. at 235-55 for a discussion of the characteristics
of corporate debt It is possible to issue corporate debt that does not require regular in
terest payments, the zero coupon bond, a debt instrument with an issue price signifi-
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tors represent a large share of the equity capital markets - any busi
ness needing to raise capital by issuing substantial equity must look to
these investors as potential purchasers.154 However, because of the cur
rent tax rules, these investors generally will not purchase equity in an
LLC or any other partnership form.155 As the tax law now stands, dis
tributive shares of an LLC's income will be taxed at the regular rates as
unrelated business income taxable to the tax-exempt investor156 and as
income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business to the for
eign investor.157 Dividends on corporate stock, however, are not taxable
at all to the tax-exempt investor,158 and foreign investors generally re
ceive dividends at significantly lower tax rates under various treaties
into which the United States has entered with its major trading part
ners.159 Consequently, growing businesses that find it necessary to raise
significant capital from the equity markets for the first time will be
forced to use the corporate form in order to reach the tax-exempt and
foreign investors. 160

cantly below the amount paid at maturity with no interest payments in between, for ex
ample. The interest element for these bonds is paid at the time of maturity. See id.
154. See MLP Hearings, supra note 150.
155. See, e.g., id. at 112-13 (statement of William S. McKee and Mark A. Kuller,
attorneys, King & Spalding); 135-36 (statement of Barksdale Hortenstine, attorney, An
drews & Kurth); 143-44 (statement of R. Donald Turlington, Attorney and Adjunct Law
Professor). If business contemplates raising capital by issuing equity in a private place
ment, neither the LLC nor the limited partnership can be used if the investors include
tax-exempt or foreign persons. These investors will insist on purchasing corporate stock
in order to receive the dividends tax free (for tax-exempt investors) or at the favorable
rate provided by the applicable treaty (for foreign investors).
156. See I.R.C.§§ 512-513; see also MLP Hearings, supra note 150, at 107-67.
157. See I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 872, 875; see also MLP Hearings, supra note 150, at
107-67.
158. See I.R.C. §§ 512-513; MLP Hearings, supra note 150, at 107-67.
159. See I.R.C. § 871(a) (imposing a withholding tax of 30%). For a general dis
cussion of tax treaties, see BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 7, <JI 15.02[4]; see also 2
U.S. Intl. Taxn. (Warre n Gorham & Lamont) <JI C4.07 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
160. If the corporate income tax rate rose to a level significantly higher than that
of the individual rate, nonpublicly traded businesses not already in corporate form prob
ably would struggle to remain unincorporated and perhaps find ways to use the LLC
and the limited partnership to undermine the corporate tax. A closely held active busi
ness of a modest size that starts out as an LLC and grows to a significant asset size,
without needing to increase the level of ownership or raise capital by issuing equity to
tax exempt and foreign investors, will simply remain an LLC in order to avoid the corporate tax. These future businesses remaining as LLCs could represent the corporations
with assets out of the range of being classified as small, but not large enough to reach
the medium-asset range. As already noted, the contributions made to the corporate tax
by these corporations cannot be categorized as insignificant or negligible. See supra
notes 101, 103, 106, 108 and 140. The number of small businesses able to grow without
substantially increasing the equity owners and tapping the tax-exempt and foreign eq
uity markets is likely small.

See MLP Hearings, supra note 150. Moreover, if it were

·
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Moreover, once the number of owners of an active business be
comes so large that the individual tax situation for each owner inevita
bly shows significant diversity, it will become very difficult for man
agement to adopt policies at the entity level to optimize the tax
consequences for all of them. Because owners of the LLC's equity must
report each year their distributive share of all the LLC's income and
losses with the peculiar tax character of each item being preserved,
management will face impossible pressure to choose courses of action
that fit all the members' circumstances. Management also will dislike
the increased pressure to distribute the earnings that the LLC inevitably
will face due to the flow through of the taxable income and will find
burdensome the disclosure of all the business decisions in the annual
partnership filings that must be provided to each member.161
An examination of the business uses of limited partnerships, an

other potential unincorporated alternative for the larger business seeking
to avoid the corporate form, further illustrates that the LLC's threat to
the corporate tax is merely theoretical. Although the choice of using an
LLC represents a fairly new development, growing active businesses
starting out as partnerships have had for quite some time the option of
using the limited partnership form to avoid paying the corporate tax.
Consequently, the past and current uses of these limited partnerships
provide clues as to the future direction of nonpublicly traded, larger
LLCs. Most nonpublicly traded limited partnerships have been used for
real estate and other investment ventures showing net losses rather than
positive taxable income. 162 When compared to larger, mostly nonpub
licly traded corporations exceeding the small-asset range, the corpora
tions, while showing fewer actual numbers in terms of the number of

possible for corporations in the in between sizes ($1 million to just under $10 million)
to use flow-throughs, at least some of them would have used limited partnerships. See
infra notes 162-65.
161. See id. at 1 16, 129. Even before LLCs became a viable option, nonpublicly
traded limited partnerships were not used for growing active businesses; rather they
were investment vehicles mostly producing losses. If growing active businesses never
chose to use limited partnerships it is highly unlikely that they will use LLCs. See infra
notes 1 62-65 and accompanying text; see also Treasury Dept. Study, Widely Held Part
nerships: Compliance and Administration Issues: A Report to Congress (Mar. 30,
1990), reprinted in 64 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Apr. 3, 1990, at L-1.
1 62. See MLP Hearings, supra note 150, at 168-74. Because of the enactment of
the passive loss limitations in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which severely limit the
ability of many limited partners to currently deduct the partnership's losses, the popular
ity of the limited partnership predictably waned. Because existing limited partnerships
exhaust their losses and eventually produce income, limited partnerships as a whole
should start to show positive income in the future, because new limited partnerships
producing initial losses are simply not being formed to the same degree.
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returns filed, produce significant taxable income,163 while limited part
nerships consistently show a net deficit. 164 Clearly corporations are pri
marily engaged in active, profitable business, but limited partnerships
have on balance been investment-oriented arrangements designed to
produce, when the economics of the investment interface with the tax
rules, tax losses. Before the LLC ever became an option, the data illus
trate that growing active businesses found it necessary to incorporate
rather than use the limited partnership form. 165 Therefore, it seems
highly unlikely that a significant number of active businesses reaching a

163. From 1980 to 1992, medium-asset corporations (and the in between corpora
tions with assets of at least $5 million to just under $10 million) filed returns numbering
55,072 ($51,369,818,000 taxable income); 58,242 ($50,899,467,000 taxable income);
60,138 ($44,245,016,000 taxable income); 62,263 ($46,222,390,000 taxable income);
68,591 ($52,282,238,000 taxable income); 71,487 ($54,161,137,000 taxable income);
73,374 ($55,814,190,000 taxable income); 79, 1 1 9 ($56,277,962,000 taxable income);
83,403 ($58,740,086,000 taxable income); 86,707 ($56,408,956,000 taxable income);
87,971 ($57,536,426,000 taxable income); 87,133 ($54,539,446,000 taxable income);
and 87,820 ($58,142,107,000 taxable income), respectively. See INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME: 1 980-1992 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS,
1980-1992 (separate volume for each year).
164. See id. From 1980 until 1992, limited partnerships numbered 170,336 (pro
ducing a net deficit of $9,392,799,000); 208,204 (producing a net deficit of
$15,691,486,000); 225,886 (producing a net deficit of $17,488,028,000); 234,000 (pro
ducing a net deficit of $18,700,000,000); 257,164 (producing a net deficit of
$22,633,300,000); 279,878 (producing a net deficit of $26,893,300,000); 273,076 (pro
ducing a net deficit of $35,517,100,000); 262,210 (producing a net deficit of
$28,169,000,000); 285,152 (producing a net deficit of $24,010,710,000); 293,637 (pro
ducing a net deficit of $21,560,743,000); 285,769 (producing a net deficit of
$21,161,231,000); 270,681 (producing a net deficit of $16,702,278,000); and 270,748
(producing a net deficit of $3,277,692,000). See STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Spring
1986, Partnership Returns 1978-82, STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Summer 1985, Partner
ship Returns 1983, STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Summer 1986, Partnership Returns 1984
and STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Summer 1987, Partnership Returns, 1985; STAT. OF IN
COME BULL., Summer 1988, Partnership Returns, 1986; STAT. OF INCOME BULL.,
Wmter 1989-1990, Partnership Returns 1987; STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Summer 1990,
Partnership Returns, 1988; STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Fall 1991, Partnership Returns,
1989; STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Summer 1993, Partnership Returns, 1990, STAT. OF
INCOME BULL., Fall 1993, Partnership Returns, 1991, STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Fall
1994, Partnership Returns 1992; STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Fall 1995, Partnership Re
turns, 1993. See also SLEMROD, supra note 83, <JI 6.4.2 (noting that the passive activity
loss limitations caused a decrease in the use of partnerships and decreased the size of
the global partnership deficit).
165. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. Although the number of cor
porate filings consistently ran less than the number of limited partnerships, those corpo
rations consistently reported over $50 billion of taxable income each year. As a group,
these corporations which numbered from 50,000 to 100,000 filings per year were
clearly engaged in profitable, active businesses. On the other hand, the limited partner
ships numbered over 200,000 each year but consistently reported significant deficits
(reaching over $35 billion in one year) evidencing real-estate and other shelter-oriented
investments rather than active, profitable business. See id.
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high-growth, profitable stage can avoid corporate status by using the
LLC form if they were unable to accomplish the same result by using a
limited partnership.
The LLC is not the only unincorporated business entity to have
posed a challenge to revenues collected from the corporate tax. Starting
in the early 1980s, publicly traded limited partnerships appeared on the
market, offering at least a theoretical ability to threaten the future cor
porate tax paid by growing active businesses reaching the initial public
offering stage. 1 66 In 1 987, however, the fear of a mass disincorporation
of American businesses prompted Congress to enact section 7704 of the
Internal Revenue Code to tax all publicly traded partnerships as
corporations.167
During the hearings, the potential revenue drain caused by publicly
traded partnerships was hotly debated.1 68 Although government officials
argued strongly to the contrary, a significant amount of compelling tes
timony and data indicated that the threat of the publicly traded limited
partnership to the corporate tax was more theoretical than real. The
rules in the business tax system that discourage tax-exempt and foreign
investors from investing in partnership equity were at the core of the ar
guments supporting publicly traded partnerships. Many different experts
testified that small businesses reaching a high growth stage simply
could not exist as publicly traded partnerships. These businesses, unable
to raise capital with debt due to the pressure to pay regular interest,
would be forced to incorporate in order to fully reach the entire capital
equity market, a large portion constituting tax-exempt and foreign in
vestors.169 Thus, the very backstop that prevents growing, nonpublicly
traded LLCs from threatening the corporate tax thematically links the
current debate over LLCs and corporate integration with the publicly
traded partnership controversy fought in the 1980s.
During the hearings, the supporters of publicly traded partnerships
pointed to the favored tax treatment of corporate debt over corporate

166. See MLP Hearings, supra note 150, at 29 (listing existing publicly traded
partnerships by year starting in 1981).
1 67. See id. at 7-38 (statement and testimony of J. Roger Mentz, Assistant Secre
tary of Tax Policy); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-495, at 943-53 (1987), reprinted in
1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1245, 2313-1689 to -1699; H.R. REP. No. 100-391 , at 1065
(1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-680 to -681.
168. See MLP Hearings, supra note 150, at 62-403.
169. Before the changes in the tax law under the 1986 Act, it was possible for ex
isting mature businesses to liquidate artd reform as publicly traded partnerships. After
the 1986 Act, this course of action would be too expensive thus confining the theoreti
cal threat to the corporate tax by publicly traded partnerships to future businesses. See
MLP Hearings, supra note 150, at 135, 160, 396.
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equify as another. feature of the business tax system preventing publicly
traded partnerships from undermining the corporate tax. The experts
testified that the investors currently purchasing interests in publicly
traded partnerships generally pay tax at the regular rates and insist on
predicable cash flow returns, similar to interest payments on corporate
debt, and in fact would invest in corporate debt if publicly traded part
nership interests were not available. Consequently, publicly traded part
nerships likely would evolve as a substitute for corporate debt issued by
mature businesses willing and able to pay a regular return.170 Because
corporations enjoy a deduction for interest payments on debt, corporate
income used to pay interest generally bears only one level of tax

-

at

the investor level. Although the return on interest in a publicly traded
partnership clearly bears no tax at the entity level, the investors will pay

tax on their shares of the partnership's income at their regular rates.
Consequently, according to these experts, the publicly traded partner
ship posed no real threat to corporate tax revenues, because mature
businesses needing to raise capital would simply issue corporate debt if
denied the opportunity to use a publicly traded partnership.171
III.

THE INCREASED USE OF LLCs AND THE CORPORATE
INTEGRATION ISSUE

A.

LLCs and the Integration of Closely Held Corporations

The current system for imposing the corporate tax on nonpublicly
traded businesses employs a double standard based on whether the busi
ness has incorporated under state law. Regardless of how modest the as
set base or how closely held the ownership level, incorporated busi
nesses that choose not to follow the S corporation restrictions face the

corporate tax. 172 Because the corporate tax is largely insignificant for
businesses that remain closely. held and small enough to pay out their
earnings in deductible items, the increased use of the LLC cannot possi
bly undermine a serious173 source of corporate tax revenue.174 Newly or-

170. From a business point of view issuing partnership equity was superior, be
cause if cash flow suddenly became tight, management could forgo a distribution on eq
uity without consequences. With corporate debt, a missed interest payment often trig
gered a default See MLP Hearings, supra note 150, at 62-403.
171. See sources cited supra notes 166-70.
172. See supra note 8.
173. See supra notes 98-109, 145 and accompanying text
174. The only way to ensure that close corporations as a group bear significant
corporate tax is to require a stated percentage of payments to shareholders to be classi
fied as dividends even if, for example, the payments represent reasonable salary. The
IRS abandoned that position, possibly because it would discriminate between reasonable
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ganizing, closely held businesses1 75 now have the option to obtain the
benefits of limited liability and one level of tax under the flexible part
nership tax provisions without incurring the transaction costs necessary
to achieve one of these benefits indirectly. 176
Furthermore, the increased use of LLCs actually improves the
overall fairness of the business tax system. The increased use of LLCs
levels the playing field between sophisticated, well-advised small busi
nesses, and unsophisticated small businesses. Before the LLC became
available, closely held businesses that could afford to either eliminate
the corporate tax by paying out all of the earnings in deductible items
or to create limited liability in a partnership enjoyed the benefits of lim
ited liability combined with one level of tax.177 On the other hand, unso
phisticated businesses were forced to make a choice between the two
advantages. If the business wanted corporate limited liability, it was
forced either to live with the restrictions of subchapter S or pay a sig
nificant corporate tax that only negligibly increased total corporate tax
revenues.1 78

deductible payments made to shareholder employees and reasonable deductible pay
ments made to third-party employees. See supra note 1 15.
175. Businesses cu"ently being operated as general or limited partnerships can
generally convert to an LLC without adverse tax consequences. Closely held businesses
operating in corporate form usually cannot convert to LLC form because of the prohibi
tively expensive tax imposed at both the corporate and the shareholder level from the
liquidation. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8 (discussing corporate "double" tax
burden compared with partnership and S corporation burdens); supra text accompanying
notes 149-52 (discussing penalty occurring on switching to LLC form).
176. See supra notes 87-91, 165 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 87-9 1 , 1 65 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 105-09, 121-22 and accompanying text. As previously noted,
the tax paid by the small-asset corporations ranged from just over $5 billion in 1986 to
just over $2.5 billion in 1992. See supra note 122. Although this number seems large, it
represents a relatively small portion of the total corporate tax paid. When focusing on
the 1992 figures, the smallest corporations pay only 2% of the entire revenues from the
corporate tax. See supra notes 122, 136, 144. The cost of leveling the playing field ap
pears to be a bit higher if you add the corporate tax paid by the corporations in between
the small- and medium-asset ranges. In 1992 corporations in the $1 million to just
under $5 million asset range paid $3,702,027,000 in corporate taxes while the $5 mil
lion to just under $10 million corporations paid $2,098,826,000 in corporate taxes. See
supra notes 108, 140. As already noted the LLC will not likely pose a threat to these
corporate taxes for a variety of reasons. First due to the distortions from measuring as
set size by gross rather than net figures, some of these corporations belong in a larger
size group. Moreover some of these corporations are probably technological, service
oriented corporations that would be in a larger group, using a stock valuation. See supra
notes 122, 126. Moreover because the limited partnership has always been available,
one can assume the same barriers (the inability to grow by issuing equity to tax-exempt
and foreign investors) that in fact prevented these businesses in the past from using lim
ited partnerships will prevent these businesses in the future from using LLCs. See supra
notes 153-65 and accompanying text.

November 1996]

LLCs and Corporate Integration

431

If tax policymakers eliminate the use of LLCs by taxing all busi
nesses that provide limited liability protection as corporations, the busi
ness tax system, as applied to small businesses, will revert to the same
unfair conditions that existed before the rise of the LLC: those busi
nesses able to incur the necessary transaction costs would be able to en
joy one level of tax and limited liability, while other businesses would
be forced to choose between these two benefits. Moreover, unsophisti
cated businesses that otherwise could avoid the corporate tax by using
the LLC form179 would at best produce only a small increase in corpo
rate tax revenues180 with that marginal increase primarily coming from
those businesses unable to secure competent advice.181 Therefore, elimi
nating LLCs by instituting a limited liability-based corporate tax would,
by unfairly favoring sophisticated businesses able to incur transaction
costs over similar182 businesses lacking the means to obtain limited lia
bility and one level of tax indirectly,183 violate fundamental principals
of horizontal equity. 1 84
Most importantly, by exposing the inequities built into the taxation
of closely held incorporated and unincorporated business, the increased
use of LLCs reveals the inexcusably poor policy of taxing small busi
ness more than once. Regardless of the form chosen under local law,
closely held small business owners tend to participate actively in their
businesses and use a decentralized management structure with signifi
cant limitations on their ability to withdraw their capital from the busi-

179. See Hamill, supra note 61, at 601-04.
180. In order for a limited liability based corporate tax to be remotely fair and
consistent it would be necessary to impose the corporate tax on businesses providing
substantive protection rather than confining the rule to statutory protection. For closely
held businesses, this would require scrutiny of partnerships using intermediary corporate
partners to create substantive limited liability. Because the trend has clearly been to
favor obtaining direct limited liability by using the corporate form, policing these part
nerships under a limited liability based corporate tax would likely produce little reve
nue. See supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text. Moreover, it would also be neces
sary to enforce the corporate tax against existing closely held corporations by policing
their ability to pay out disguised dividends in deductible items, a goal unlikely to be
achieved. See supra notes 1 10-25 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 1 17-20 and accompanying text Also, a portion of the corpo
rate income tax paid by these corporations undoubtedly comes from service-oriented
corporations that appear smaller than they are when measuring size based on assets. See
supra note 126.
182. See generally, 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 94, §§ 1.05, 1 .07 n.2
(describing various situations under which closely held corporations may arise).
183. See supra notes 98-125 and accompanying text
184. Although these corporations contribute a negligible amount to corporate reve
nues, see supra notes 98-109, the impact of the tax on the individual closely held corpo
ration is probably far from negligible.
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ness.185 Applying a significantly different taxation regime (the corporate
or the partnership) to a closely held business solely because of the in
consequential act of incorporating (or remaining unincorporated) also
treats similar taxpayers differently and therefore violates the fundamen
tal principals of horizontal equity. Consequently, even before the LLC
became available, no valid policy reason existed to support the corpo
rate tax as applied to closely held small businesses.186
Finally, by bringing the inequities between the incorporated and
unincorporated forms out of the closet, the rise of the LLC form should
compel lawmakers to integrate small closely held businesses as quickly
as

possible.187 Only after closely held corporations achieve integration

will the tax system treat similar small businesses similarly.188 Moreover,
as

long as closely held corporations remain subject to the corporate tax,

small businesses will continue to choose LLCs over corporations in
185. See 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 94, § 1.08; see also Annando
Gomez, Rationalizing the Taxation of Business Entities, 49 TAX LAW. 285, 289 (1996);
Harry J. Haynsworth, The Need for a Unified Small Business Structure, 33 Bus. LAW.
849, 854-56 (1978).
186. See Haynsworth, supra note 185, at 861-69; cf. Gomez, supra note 185, at
300-02 (describing difficulty of formulating workable judicial definition of
"corporation").
1 87. Focusing on the corporate tax paid by the smallest corporations, the revenue
cost for integrating small-asset corporations would likely be between $2 billion and $3
billion. See supra note 122. If Congress chooses to only integrate small-asset corpora
tions, the line would be difficult to draw. One could then attempt to draw the line on the
basis of asset size, shareholder number, or other considerations. See generally DIVISION
OF TAX REsEARCH, TREASURY DEPT., TAXATION OF SMALL BUSINESS (Oct. 1947);
Berger, supra note 64; William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Business Form, Limited Lia
bility and Tax Regimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?, 66 U. COLO. L. REv.
1001 , 1014-15 (1995); Joseph A. Snoe, The Entity Tax and Corporate Integration: An
Agency Cost Analysis and a Call for a Deferred Distributions Tax, 48 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1 (1993). As already noted, grouping corporations according to true value would
be difficult because true value cannot be measured in all corporations using the same
valuation method. See supra notes 122, 126.
1 88. In 1992, the Treasury Department reported on prototypes, dividend exclusion,
shareholder allocation, the Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT), the imputation
credit prototype, and the dividend deduction alternative as a means to achieve corporate
integration. All of these methods except the CBIT, the method least likely to be adopted
in the near future, would leave in place differences between the incorporated and unin
corporated business tax regimes. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, REPORT ON IN
TEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSI
NESS INCOME ONCE (Jan. 1992). The Treasury subsequently recommended the
dividend exclusion prototype. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, A RECOMMENDA
TION FOR INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS
(Dec. 1992); see also AMERICAN LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, IN
TEGRATION OF THE CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES (1993) (Alvin
Warren, Reporter). Regardless of which method Congress adopts, the planning opportu
nities left in place between the incorporated and unincorporated worlds will likely be
minor and therefore should not discourage the adoption of integration generally.
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greater numbers in order to achieve the benefits of partnership taxation
directly, rather than be subject to the S corporation restrictions or incur
the transaction costs of paying out all earnings in deductible items.
Only after lawmakers integrate close corporations, thus removing the
tax advantage LLCs currently enjoy, can new businesses choose be
tween the LLC and the closely held corporation without regard to tax
consequences; and only then will it be possible to determine if the
LLC's business provisions truly offer a superior combination of the cor
porate and partnership forms.
B.

LLCs and the Question of Integrating Larger Corporations

Because under the current system LLCs have no practical ability to
undermine the corporate tax paid by larger corporations, the increased
use of the LLC form does not compel tax policy makers to affina
n 
tively deal with the corporate integration question.189 However, despite
the LLC's inability to affect the corporate tax imposed on larger busi
nesses, the LLC's theoretical ability to allow larger businesses to com
bine statutory limited liability with one level of tax under the partner
ship provisions may tempt tax policymakers to re-examine what role
limited liability should play when imposing the corporate tax. Because
businesses engaged in active profit-making activities reaching a certain
size and growth level cannot use LLCs, a limited liability-based corpo
rate tax will not affect the type of entity chosen by those businesses they will continue to operate as corporations. Nevertheless, from the
perspective of businesses, that traditionally have used limited partner
ships, a proposed change in the law (modeled after the proposed regula
tions in 1980), imposing the corporate tax on all entities offering statu
tory limited liability protection should be summarily rejected as merely
elevating form over substance.190 A limited liability-based corporate tax
would still allow limited partnerships that offer the same degree of sub
stantive limited liability protection as LLCs to continue enjoying one
level of taxation under the partnership provisions.191 Because in the
larger-business range, LLCs only offer a practical alternative to limited
189. See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text. See supra note 178 (LLCs
have no ability to undermine corporate tax paid by corporations above the small-asset
but below the medium-asset range).
190. In addition to all the protest that accompanied the 1980 proposed regulations,
the LLC bar would predictably criticize the proposal as well. See supra notes 40-44 and
accompanying text. Given the already widespread state enactment and current use of
LLCs, the scope and number of LLC proponents would be significantly broader and
greater than the publicly traded partnership proponents in 1 987.
191. See Hamill, supra note 61, at 581-89; see supra notes 32-44 and accompany
ing text.
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partnerships a limited liability based corporate tax will not increase the
corporate tax revenues.192
A corporate tax imposed on all businesses offering statutory or
substantive limited liability193 would, by sweeping within the realm of
the corporate tax all LLCs, as well as many partnerships providing sub
stantive limited liability, represent far more than a cosmetic elevation of
form over substance. 1 94 Ignoring the administrative complexities of de
fining when an entity enjoys substantive limited liability, 1 95 this rule
would go beyond merely maintaining the corporate tax in its present
form and would represent a strong policy statement in favor of ex
panding the corporate tax. 1 96 Arguably, however, an extension of the
corporate tax using substantive limited liability would be unwise for at
least two reasons. First, it would severely disrupt the current business
climate and would call into question the status of many partnerships. 1 97
Second, the provisions surrounding the structure of the corporate tax
contain many opportunities to mitigate its effect, which arguably sends
a policy signal against any further expansion of the corporate tax be
yond the corporate form. 1 98
More importantly, the LLC's presence, rapid growth, and (in many
ways) similarity to the corporate form helps reveal the conflicting sig
nals within the system for taxing business organizations. The reasons
why the LLC's threat to the corporate tax will remain theoretical can be
traced directly to the conflicts within the corporate tax itself, which ex
ist because the different tax regimes of the incorporated and unincorpo
rated worlds often do not work well together. Assuming the global tax
policy goal seeks to ensure that business earnings used to pay returns
on equity bear at least one level of tax, the law must require tax-exempt
and foreign investors owning partnership equity to recognize unrelated

192.
193.
194.
195.

See supra notes 149-71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.

Drawing an administrative line in order to determine when a partnership has
achieved substantive limited liability protection would be difficult but arguably no more
difficult than establishing the line for public trading for purposes of the publicly traded
partnership provisions.
196. Whether the corporate tax should be expanded by attempting to tax all enti
ties with substantive limited liability as corporations is beyond the scope of this article.
Most authorities, when discussing the corporate tax, favor integration or elimination of
the inconsistencies in the current system - with the disparate treatment of debt and eq
uity being the worst example. Virtually no commentator has advocated a radical exten
sion of the corporate tax based on substantive limited liability. See sources cited supra
note 19.
197. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 199-214 and accompanying text.
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business taxable income and income effectively connected with a U.S.
trade or business in order to ensure that this income, not subject to tax
at the partnership level, bears at least one level of tax.199 Because corpo
rations must pay tax on income used to pay dividends, the tax law can
allow tax-exempt and foreign investors to maintain their favored tax
status when receiving dividends because the income still bears one level
of U.S. tax.200
When compared to the tax consequences imposed generally on eq
uity investors paying tax at the regular rates, the rules denying tax
exempt and foreign investors their favored tax treatment for partnership
equity helps reveal distortions in investment behavior caused by the
corporate tax system. Income earned by a corporation to pay dividends
to a taxable investor will be subject to the two-tier tax (once at the cor
porate level and then again at the shareholder level) while the same in
come earned by a partnership suffers one level of tax - at the investor
level. Because the relief from the entity-level tax potentially allows the
partnership to pay a higher rate of return, the two-tier corporate tax cre
ates a bias against investments in corporate equity. As noted above, the
bias against investments in corporate equity does not exist for tax
exempt and foreign investors, because the law imposes one level of tax
on earnings, used to pay equity returns to these investors, in both the
corporate and unincorporated forms. However, tax law, which imposes
tax at the investor level for partnership equity and at the entity level for
corporate equity, creates a bias in the opposite direction: tax-exempt
and foreign investors will choose corporate equity over partnership eq
uity in order to maintain their favored tax treatment.201
Unlike publicly traded partnerships before the law taxed them as
corporations, LLCs currently offer no new material alternatives to issu
ing corporate debt to raise capital. Consequently, the rise of the LLC
does not directly expose the most controversial aspect of the corporate
tax structure - the disparate treatment between corporate debt and eq
uity. The rise of the LLC, however, arguably helps reveal the distortions
caused by the corporate debt-equity distinction because the favorable
treatment granted to tax-exempt and foreign investors, the very back
stops that prevent the LLC from becoming a practical threat, create a
heavy incentive in favor of issuing debt to tax-exempt and foreign in-

199. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text
200. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text
201. See MLP Hearings, supra note 150. Although, from the global perspective,
income earned for returns on partnership and corporate equity roughly bears the same
tax, once at some level, the tax-exempt and foreign investors will choose corporate eq
uity because that one level of tax will be borne by the corporation. See id.
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vestors. The tax system encourages all investors to purchase corporate
debt instead of corporate equity.202 Because of the corporate interest de
duction, the corporation bears no tax on the income used to pay the in
terest, which generally allows the investor to enjoy a higher rate of re
turn on interest rather than dividends, the return on corporate equity.203
The tax system further favors tax-exempt and foreign investors by al
lowing their receipt of interest to remain tax free.204 Thus when examin
ing the taxation of income earned to pay interest on debt from the en
tity's perspective, the corporate and noncorporate forms generally enjoy
no distinct advantages over each other because in both instances the in
come used to pay interest escapes tax at the entity level. However by
requiring taxable investors to pay tax on interest at the regular rates
while tax-exempt or foreign investors receive interest tax free, the tax
system encourages all larger businesses willing and able to pay regular
returns to raise capital by issuing debt to tax-exempt and foreign inves
tors. Because earnings used to pay interest to these investors escapes
U.S. tax entirely, the investment can yield the highest after-tax rate of
return.205
Because of the practical inability of larger businesses to use the
LLC structure, their presence will have no effect on the real corporate
tax collected as modified by provisions that allow the tax to be miti
gated. However, the addition of the LLC to the overall business land
scape and its theoretical possibility of being chosen over larger nonpub
lic corporations helps expose the conflicting signals within the entire
system for taxing business organizations. On the one hand, the system
clearly allows businesses to mitigate the corporate tax in a variety of
ways;206 on the other hand the system refuses to give up all the reve
nues the corporate tax brings.207 The competing desires to mitigate the
corporate tax and at the same time preserve some portion of the corpo
rate tax revenues has resulted in a number of economic distortions in
investment decisions, the decision to issue corporate debt over equity

202. See MLP Hearings, supra note 150; Treasury Study on Integration, infra note
208.
203. See id. But see I.R.C. § 1 63(f) (corporate interest deduction denied if recipi
ent bears no tax and the amount deemed excessive under the provision). See also Je
rome Kurtz, The Interest Deduction Under Our Hybrid Tax System: Muddling Toward
Accommodation, 50 TAX L. REv. 153 (1995).
204. See I.R.C. §§ 512, 87l(h).
205. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text
206. See supra section II.A.
207. See MLP Hearings, supra note 150, at 1 1 5 (statement of William S. McKee
& Mark A. Kuller, Partners, King & Spalding) ("In short, everyone seems to agree that
the corporate tax is a bad tax, but that nothing much can be done about it because we
need the money.").
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being the most obvious and arguably the most economically harmful
example.208
In the early 1980s when publicly traded partnerships first emerged
on the market, they similarly revealed the same distortions in the corpo
rate tax system.209 The very market that publicly traded partnerships had
tapped into - taxable investors expecting regular returns, who other
wise would purchase corporate debt - was made possible by the dispa
rate treatment between corporate equity and debt. Corporations in ma
ture, active businesses that sought to raise capital from investors paying
tax at the regular rates had a choice of issuing interests in publicly
traded partnerships bearing one level of tax at the investor level rather
than corporate debt which also bore only one level of tax to regular tax
payers.210 Moreover, the same forces that will prevent LLCs from be
coming a real threat to the corporate tax arguably would have prevented
publicly traded partnerships from causing a massive revenue drain on
the corporate tax. According to the experts who support publicly traded
partnerships, growing, active businesses that needed to raise large
amounts of capital with equity, not expected to pay regular returns, had
to incorporate in order to market equity to tax-exempt and foreign
investors.21 1
B y taxing publicly traded partnerships as corporations, lawmakers
arguably killed the messenger that brought the bad news - the incon
sistent and inequitable provisions within the corporate tax itself. The
1987 publicly traded partnership legislation allowed tax policymakers to
avoid deciding the more difficult issue of whether corporations should
be integrated or whether the distortions weakening the corporate tax
should be eliminated. The presence of the LLC offers a similar theoreti
cal threat as the publicly traded partnership did before 1 987, albeit in a
less dramatic form because of the inability of LLCs to cross over into
the publicly traded market.21 2 In order to create the illusion of consis
tency and harmony in the business tax system, lawmakers could elimi-

208. See supra note 128. For an extensive discussion of the economic distortions
caused by the corporate tax, see REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY ON IN
TEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS (Jan. 1992) re
printed in HIG:m..IGHTS & DOCUMENTS, Jan. 7, 1992, at 3-1 1; see also Peter Cannel
los, The Over-Leveraged Acquisition, 39 TAX LAW. 91 (1985).
209. See generally MLP Hearings, supra note 150.
210. See I.R.C. § 7704 (1994); MLP Hearings, supra note 150, at 1 14-15.
21 1 . See generally MLP Hearings, supra note 150, at 62-403.
212. Technically, publicly traded corporations are subject to the corporate tax pro
visions due to corporate status, see I.R.C. § 1 1 (1994), while I.R.C. § 7704 (1994) im
poses per se corporate taxation on publicly traded partnerships. However, if the public
corporation theoretically chose to operate as a limited partnership or LLC, § 7704
would mandate corporate taxation. Section 7704 effectively establishes one line based
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nate the LLC by imposing the corporate tax on all entities offering stat
utory limited liability protection. As already noted, this course of action
would result in no significant corporate revenues and would leave the
current distortions that plague the taxation of business organizations in
place.213 Hopefully the presence of the LLC will instead encourage fur
ther progress toward a careful and well considered solution to the cor
porate integration question.21 4
CONCLUSION
The motives behind the very creation of the LLC form, to provide
foreign clients with a business structure option offering limited liability
and one level of taxation, can be traced to the lack of a consistent sys
tem for taxing business organizations. Because the LLC's sole function
initially revolved around filling the void left open by the corporate inte
gration question - should corporations, the only U.S. entity offering
direct limited liability, be subject to a two-tier tax - the LLC stood no
chance of gaining widespread acceptance as a serious alternative for do
ing business until it secured the right to receive one level of tax under
the partnership provisions. Once the LLC achieved partnership status
for tax purposes, the market, consisting of the individual states and the
businesses operating in those states, predictably embraced the LLC with
open arms and quickly enacted statutes and chose to use LLCs.
From the perspective of closely held businesses, the increased use
of LLCs represents a positive development as it levels the playing field
between sophisticated businesses that have always obtained the LLC's
benefits indirectly and other businesses that have been compromised
into either paying some level of corporate tax or incurring personal lia
bility exposure. The LLC offers both groups an easy way to obtain stat
utory limited liability protection for all owners and one level of tax
under the partnership provisions. Moreover, the LLC's rapid rise among
small businesses exposes the tax handicaps suffered by closely held cor
porations and the absurdity of having two radically different tax re
gimes, the corporate or the partnership, apply to substantively identical
businesses. At a minimum, Congress should adopt some form of inte
gration for small, closely held corporations as quickly as possible, and

on public trading in which all businesses are subject to the corporate tax regardless of
the form chosen under local law.
213. See supra notes 121-25, 144-52.
214. See sources cited supra note 19. For a thoughtful discussion attributing the
slow progress toward resolution of the integration on the preference of corporate man
agement and other political forces to mitigate the corporate tax indirectly through other
mechanisms, see Arlen & Weiss, supra note 19.
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allow small business to choose an entity structure based on business
considerations alone. At that time, the LLC will either show its mettle
as the truly superior form on the business merits or it will die away, be
cause the tax advantages it now enjoys over the corporate form will
have largely disappeared.
From the perspective of the taxation of larger businesses, the in
creased use of LLCs adds more distractions into a tax system that is al
ready a maze. Because the current business tax system allows any non
publicly traded business to use the partnership or the LLC form, the
increased use of LLCs theoretically undermines the corporate tax paid
by the larger nonpublicly traded corporations. However, other provi
sions within the business tax structure that effectively discourage tax
exempt and foreign investors from purchasing noncorporate equity will
prevent the LLC, as it has prevented the limited partnership in the past,
from posing any serious practical challenge to the corporate tax paid by
these larger corporations. Consequently, if lawmakers simply leave
LLCs alone, the corporate tax revenues will not be reduced by the in
creased use of LLCs.
The theoretical challenge to the corporate tax posed by LLCs helps
to reveal the serious imperfections of the business tax system. The cen
tral reason why the LLC and the limited partnership pose a mere theo
retical threat to the corporate tax - their inability to tap the tax-exempt
and foreign equity markets - exists because of the radically different
structure of the corporate and partnership tax regimes. The provisions
that fully tax tax-exempt and foreign investors on returns from partner
ship equity serve as a backstop to the flow-through treatment of part
nerships, and prevent that income from completely or almost com
pletely escaping the U.S. tax system. The entity level tax on corporate
income used to pay dividends ensures one level of tax, and thereby al
lows the system to tolerate these investors complete or almost complete
tax avoidance on dividends. Dividends paid to taxable investors, how
ever, receive the harshest treatment, a two-tier tax at both the corporate
and investor levels. Consequently, the business tax system creates a bias
discouraging taxable investors from, and encouraging tax-exempt and
foreign investors to, purchase corporate equity.
Moreover, the favored treatment that corporate debt enjoys over
corporate equity in the context of tax-exempt foreign and taxable inves
tors further reveals more distortive effects of the two-tier corporate tax.
The current business tax system creates a bias for all investors to favor
debt over equity because debt investments will generally yield a higher
after-tax rate of return. Moreover, because interest received by taxable
investors bears one level of tax and escapes tax entirely in the hands of
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tax-exempt or foreign investors, debt issued to tax-exempt and foreign
investors enjoys the most favored tax treatment and therefore has the
potential to yield the greatest after-tax rate of return. Consequently, is
suers that are willing and able to pay the regular return, required by
most debt as a business matter, will prefer for tax reasons to market
debt to tax-exempt and foreign investors instead of taxable investors.
Although the LLC cannot become a serious alternative for larger
businesses, as the LLC gains more acceptance and takes its place in the
mainstream of smaller businesses, it will become increasingly difficult
for lawmakers to pretend that the current corporate tax system, co
existing as it does with complete pass-through taxation for partnerships,
contains any rationally based tax policy. The increased use of LLCs ex
poses the disconcerted tax regimes of the incorporated and unincorpo
rated worlds and implores tax policymakers to take a serious look at
business taxation and work toward a careful well considered resolution
of the corporate integration issue.
APPENDIX
Between September 2, 1988 - the date of the IR.S's ruling classi
fying the Wyoming LLC as a partnership - and December 3 1 , 1989,
approximately thirty-two new LLCs had filed to do business in Wyo
ming,21 5 an increase of almost seventy-three percent when compared to
all previous Wyoming LLC filings.21 6 By 1991 a combined total of ap
proximately 1700 new LLCs filed to do business in the eight states
boasting LLC acts, with Colorado emerging as the leader with approxi
mately 350 LLC filings by year's end 1991.2 1 7 In 1992 the seventeen

215. See Cochran Interview, supra note 46.
216. See supra note 46. Adding the estimated eight LLC filings that occurred in
1988 after Revenue Ruling 88-76 to the twenty-four new LLC registrations for 1989
yields thirty-two.
Because Florida LLCs could rely on Revenue Ruling 88-76 and receive partnership
tax treatment, it is reasonable to assume that the rate of LLC growth in Florida mirrored
that of Wyoming. See supra note 46.
217. See Letter from the Office of the Colorado Secretary of State (Sept. 5, 1995)
[hereinafter Colorado Letter]; Telephone Cushing Interview, supra note 46; Telephone
Interview with Jackie Barnes, Office of the Kansas Secretary of State (Aug. 29, 1995)
[hereinafter Barnes Interview]; Telephone Interview with Mike Lee Office of the Ne
vada Secretary of State (Feb. 6, 1996) [hereinafter Lee Interview]; Telephone Interview
with Delores Eitt, Office of the Texas Secretary of State (Sept. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Eitt
Interview]; Telephone Interview with Cathy Berg, Office of the Utah Secretary of State
(Aug. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Berg Interview]; Telephone Interview with Kim Monk, Of
fice of the Virginia Secretary of State (Aug. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Monk Interview];
Cochran Interview, supra note 46.
Statistics received from Colorado and Utah were based on a fiscal year ending on
June 30. Data obtained from Texas were based on a fiscal year ending August 3 1 . In
,
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states that were then accepting LLC applications established approxi
mately 7000 new LLCs, roughly four times the number of 1991 fil
ings.21 8 The Southwestern and Western states, including Colorado,

each instance, calendar year figures were estimated by dividing each fiscal year total by
twelve months and attributing to each portion of the calendar year a number equal to
the monthly average multiplied by the number of months in the portion of the calendar
year covered by the fiscal year.
Florida, Kansas, Nevada, Texas, Utah, Vrrginia, and Wyoming do not maintain
records that separate the total number of LLC filings into domestic LLCs and foreign
LLCs. Domestic LLCs are those that have organized under the laws of a particular
state, say State X. By contrast, foreign LLCs are LLCs that have formed under the laws
of another state and have then qualified to do business in State X. In tabulating the
number of LLCs, it is important to exclude foreign LLCs in order to avoid double
counting. So, to approximate the number of foreign LLCs in the above states (and thus
exclude them from our LLC count), we calculated the average percentage of new for�
eign LLCs each year in states that do distinguish between domestic and foreign LLC
filings and multiplied each year's average percentage by the total LLC filings each year
in the above states that do not record domestic and foreign data separately. We then
subtracted the result, which represents an estimate of the number of foreign LLCs, from
the number of total LLC filings to achieve an approximation of the number of domestic
LLCs registered in these states.
Nevada and Florida were unable to provide yearly statistics on new LLC filings
but were able to furnish year-to-date information. To estimate the number of filings per
year in Nevada, we multiplied Nevada's total year-to-date filings as of December 31,
1995 by the average percentage of LLC filings per year in states that maintain yearly
data and whose LLC statutes were likewise enacted in 1991. We approximated the num
ber of yearly filings in Florida based upon the percentage of new LLC registrations in
Wyoming each year.
218. See Telephone Interview with Bill Parkerson, Office of the Arizona Secretary
of State (Sept. 5, 1995) [hereinafter Parkerson Interview]; Colorado Letter, supra note
217; Telephone Interview with Pauline Fry, Office of the Delaware Department of State
(Aug. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Fry Interview]; Cushing Interview, supra note 46; Tele
phone Interview with Tess Cornett, Office of the Georgia Secretary of State (Sept. 7,
1995) [hereinafter Cornett Interview]; Telephone Interview with Karen Ubaldo, Office
of the Iowa Secretary of State (Sept. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Ubaldo Interview]; Barnes
Interview, supra note 217; Telephone Interview with Deborah O'Banion, Office of the
Louisiana Secretary of State (Aug. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Barnes Interview]; Letter from
Joe Jenkins, SpecPrint, 7R Aylesbury Road, Timonium, Md. 21093 (Oct. 25, 1995) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Jenkins Letter]; Lee Interview, supra note 217; Letter from
Doena Bortvit, Office of the Oklahoma Secretary of State (Sept. 7, 1995) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Bortvit Interview]; Telephone Interview with Cathy Albanese, Of
fice of the Rhode Island Secretary of State (Sept. 1 , 1995) [hereinafter Albanese Inter
view]; Eitt Interview, supra note 217; Berg Interview, supra note 217; Monk Interview,
supra note 217; Telephone Interview with Darlene Atkinson, Office of the West Vrr
ginia Secretary of State (Jan. 19, 1996) [hereinafter Atkinson Interview]; Cochran Inter
view, supra note 217.
Statistics received from Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, and Utah were based upon a
fiscal year ending on June 30. Data obtained from Texas were based upon a fiscal year
ending August 31. See supra note 217, for an explanation of calendar year estimates.
Florida, Kansas, Nevada, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vrrginia, West Vrrginia, and
Wyoming do not maintain records that separate the total number of LLC filings into do
mestic LLCs and foreign LLCs. See supra note 217, for an explanation of domestic and
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Texas, Utah, and Wyoming, were the first to enact LLC statutes and re
mained the leaders in LLC formation, organizing over 1 000 LLCs each
between the time they began accepting filings and December 3 1 ,
1992.219 Thus, in a period of just over four years, over 8500 LLCs were
created.220
The boom of businesses filing as LLCs continued in the years fol
lowing 1992. By 1994, it was clear that this new business entity was a
viable alternative to the partnership and the corporation. In 1 993 thirty
two states collectively recognized over 23,000 new LLCs.22 1 Of the
thirty-two states accepting LLC filings in 1 993, Texas, Utah, and Colo-

foreign LLCs and the process of approximating the number of domestic and foreign
LLCs in states not recording separate statistics.
Florida, Nevada, and West Vrrginia were unable to provide yearly statistics on new
LLC filings but were able to furnish year-to-date information. See supra note 217, for
explanation of how year-by-year figures were approximated in Florida and Nevada. To
estimate yearly filings in West Vrrginia, we multiplied West Vrrginia's total year-to-date
filings as of December 31, 1995 by the average percentage of LLC filings per year in
states that maintain yearly data and whose LLC statutes were likewise enacted in 1 992.
219. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
221 . See Telephone Interview with Joanne Ninesling, Office of the Alabama Sec
retary of State (Jan. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Ninesling Interview]; Parkerson Interview,
supra note 218; Telephone Interview with Charlotte Henderson, Office of the Arkansas
Secretary of State (Sept 25, 1995) [hereinafter Henderson Interview]; Colorado Letter
supra note 217; Telephone Interview with Diane Stier, Office of the Connecticut Secre
tary of State (Sept. 8, 1995) [hereinafter Stier]; Fry Interview, supra note 218; Cushing
Interview, supra note 46; Cornett Interview, supra note 218; Telephone Interview with
Tonya (could not release last name), Office of the Idaho Secretary of State (Sept. 1,
1995) [hereinafter Tonya Interview]; Telephone Interview with Bob Gardner, Office of
the Indiana Secretary of State (Sept. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Gardner Interview]; Ubaldo
Interview, supra note 218; Barnes Interview, supra note 64; O'Banion Interview, supra
note 218; Jenkins Letter, supra note 218; Telephone Interview with Kit Murphy, Office
of the Michigan Secretary of State (Sept. 1 , 1995) [hereinafter Murphy Interview]; Tele
phone Interview with Nancy Kurtz, Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State (Aug.
30, 1 995) [hereinafter Kurtz Interview]; Telephone Interview with Patty Hartman, Of
fice of the Missouri Secretary of State (Jan. 18, 1 996) [hereinafter Hartman Interview];
Telephone Interview with Garth Jacobson, Office of the Montana Secretary of State
(Jan. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Jacobson Interview]; Telephone Interview with Julie Von
Busch, Office of the Nebraska Secretary of State (Sept. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Von Busch
Interview]; Lee Interview, supra note 217; Telephone Interview with Diana Northcott,
Office of the New Hampshire Secretary of State (Sept. 12, 1 995) [hereinafter Northcott
Interview]; Telephone Interview with Manuel Salinas, Office of the New Mexico Secre
tary of State (Sept. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Salinas Interview]; Telephone Interview with
Bonnie Elek, Office of the North Carolina Secretary of State (Jan. 3 1 , 1 996) [hereinaf
ter Elek Interview]; Telephone Interview with Clara Jenkins, Office of the North Dakota
Secretary of State (Sept. 13, 1995) [hereinafter Jenkins Interview]; Bortvit Letter, supra
note 218; Albanese Interview, supra note 218; Telephone Interview with Penny Nelson,
Office of the South Dakota Secretary of State (Sept. 5, 1995) [hereinafter Nelson Inter
view]; Eitt Interview, supra note 217; Berg Interview, supra note 217; Monk Interview,
supra note 217; Atkinson Interview, supra note 218; Cochran Interview, supra note 46.
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rado continued to lead the pack. Utah and Colorado each created over
2000 new LLCs, while Texas organized more LLCs than any other
state, roughly 3000 in 1993 alone. Other states that quic_kly embraced
the new business entity included Arizona, Maryland, and Virginia, each
registering over 1000 new LLCs in 1993. And not far behind these
frontrunners were Louisiana, Michigan, and Oklahoma, each of which
exceeded 900 new LLC filings in 1993.
In 1994 forty-four states and the District of Columbia received ap
proximately 64,000 new LLC registrations.222 That same year, sixteen

Statistics received from Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, and Utah were based upon a
fiscal year ending on June 30. Data obtained from Texas were based upon a fiscal year
ending August 31. See supra note 217, for explanation of calendar year estimates.
Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Vrrginia, West Vrrginia, and Wyoming do not maintain records that separate the
total number of LLC filings into domestic LLCs and foreign LLCs. See supra note 217,
for an explanation of domestic and foreign LLCs and the process of approximating the
number of domestic and foreign LLCs in states not recording separate statistics.
Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, and
West Vrrginia were unable to provide yearly statistics on new LLC filings but were able
to furnish year-to-date information. See supra note 217, for an explanation of how year
by-year figures were approximated in Florida and Nevada. See supra note 218, for an
explanation of how year-by-year figures were approximated in West Vrrginia. To esti
mate yearly filings in Alabama, Connecticut, Missouri, Montana, and North Carolina,
we multiplied the total year-to-date filings in each state as of December 3 1 , 1995 by the
average percentage of LLC filings per year in states that maintain yearly data and
whose LLC statutes were likewise enacted in 1993.
222. See Ninesling Interview, supra note 221; Parkerson Interview, supra note
221; Henderson Interview, supra note 221; Telephone Interview with Cynthia Willis,
Office of the California Secretary of State (Sept. 13, 1995) [hereinafter Willis Inter
view]; Colorado Letter, supra note 217; Stier Interview, supra note 221; Fry Interview,
supra note 218; Telephone Interview with Marchelle Harris, D.C. Dept. of Consumer
and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Information Services (Mar. 6, 1996) [hereinafter Har
ris Interview]; Cushing Interview, supra note 46; Cornett Interview, supra note 218;
Tonya Interview, supra note 221; Telephone Interview with Jennifer Borders, Office of
the Illinois Secretary of State (Aug. 29, 1995) [hereinafter Borders Interview]; Gardner
Interview, supra note 221; Ubaldo Interview, supra note 218; Barnes Interview, supra
note 217; Telephone Interview with Ann Hanly, Office of the Kentucky Secretary of
State (Sept. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Hanly Interview]; O'Banion Interview, supra note
218; Jenkins Letter, supra note 218; Murphy Interview, supra note 221; Kurtz Inter
view, supra note 221; Telephone Interview with Cathy French, Office of the Mississippi
Secretary of State (Sept. 15, 1995) [hereinafter French Interview]; Hartman Interview,
supra note 221, Jacobson Interview, supra note 221; Von Busch Interview, supra note
221; Lee Interview, supra note 217; Northcott Interview, supra note 221; Telephone In
terview with Greg Harkham, Office of the New Jersey Secretary of State (Sept. 12,
1995) [hereinafter Harkham Interview]; Salinas Interview, supra note 221; Telephone
Interview with Alan Adami, Office of the New York Secretary of State (Sept. 7, 1995)
[hereinafter Adami Interview]; Elek Interview, supra note 221; Jenkins Interview, supra
note 221; Telephone Interview with Judy Geers, Office of the Ohio Secretary of State
(Sept. 12, 1995) [hereinafter Geers Interview]; Bortvit Letter, supra note 218; Tele
phone Interview with Dorothy Peterson, Office of the Oregon Secretary of State (Sept.
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states, including Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, and Wyoming, each established over
1000 new LLCs. It is notable that New York did not begin accepting
LLC applications until October 24, 1 994, and yet by December 3 1 ,
1994 (a period of just under ten weeks) it registered over 1 000 LLCs.
States exceeding the 2000 mark for 1994 included . Connecticut, Dela
ware, New Jersey, Vrrginia, and Wisconsin. These data clearly indicate
that even though the LLC boom commenced primarily in the South and
Midwest, the East coast states have enthusiastically embraced this new
business form. While the LLC trend had caught on in every region of
the United States by the end of 1994, the Southwestern and Midwestern
states who were among the earliest to enact LLC statutes continued to
file the most new LLCs annually. Arizona and Utah each organized
over 3000 new LLCs in 1994, and Texas and Colorado each created
over 4000 new LLCs that year. In addition, Michigan, a relative new
comer that enacted its LLC statute in 1993, filed approximately 3800
new LLCs in 1994.223
5, 1995) [hereinafter Peterson Interview]; Albanese Interview, supra note 218; Tele·
phone Interview with Jody Steigerwalt, Office of the South Carolina Secretary of State

(Feb. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Steigerwalt Interview]; Nelson Interview, supra note 221;
Telephone Interview with Vickie Bailiff, Office of the Tennessee Secretary of State
(Sept 12, 1995) [hereinafter Bailiff Interview]; Eitt Interview, supra note 217; Berg In·
terview, supra note 217; Monk Interview, supra note 217; Telephone Interview with El·

len Meyers, Office of the Washington Secretary of State (Oct. 14, 1995) [hereinafter
Meyers Interview]; Atkinson Interview, supra note 218; Telephone Interview with Ber
nice Smith, Office of the Wisconsin Secretary of State (Sept. 13, 1995); Cochran Inter·
view, supra note 46.
Statistics received from Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, and

Utah were based upon a

fiscal year ending on June 30. Data obtained from Texas was based upon a fiscal year
ending August 3 1 . See supra note 217, for an explanation of calendar year estimates.
California, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming
do not maintain records that separate the total number of LLC filings into domestic
LLCs and foreign LLCs. See supra note 217, for an explanation of domestic and for
eign LLCs and the process of approximating the number of domestic and foreign LLCs
in states not recording separate statistics.
Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Car
olina, and West Vrrginia were unable to provide yearly statistics on new LLC filings but
were able to furnish year-to-date information. See supra note 217, for an explanation of
how year-by-year figures were approximated in Florida and Nevada. See supra note

218, for an explanation of how year-by-year figures were approximated in West Vir
ginia. See supra note 221, for an explanation of how year-by-year figures were approxi
mated in Alabama, Connecticut, Missouri, Montana, and North Carolina. To estimate
yearly filings in Kentucky, we multiplied its total year-to-date filings as of December
31, 1995 by the average percentage of LLC filings per year in states that maintain
yearly data and that likewise began registering LLCs in 1994.
223. See supra note 222 and accompanying text
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In 1995 forty-seven states and the District of Columbia exper
ienced explosive growth in the number of new LLC formations, ac
cepting roughly 1 15,000 new LLC filings.224 For example, New York
224. See Ninesling Interview, supra note 221; Telephone Interview with Kris
Kramer, Office of the Alaska Secretary of State (Jan. 16, 1996); Parkerson Interview,
supra note 221; Henderson Interview, supra note 221; Willis Interview, supra note 222;
Colorado Letter, supra note 217; Stier Interview, supra note 221, Fry Interview, supra
note 218; Harris Interview, supra note 222; Cushing Interview, supra note 46; Cornett
Interview, supra note 218; Tonya Interview, supra note 221; Borders Interview, supra
note 222; Telephone Interview with John Ernst, Office of the Indiana Secretary of State
(Jan. 26, 1996); Ubaldo Interview, supra note 218; Barnes Interview, supra note 217;
Hanly Interview, supra note 223; O'Banion Interview, supra note 218; Telephone Inter
view with Tracy Willett, Office of the Maine Secretary of State (Jan. 25, 1996); Jenkins
Letter, supra note 218; Telephone Interview with Susie Smith, Office of the Michigan
Secretary of State (Jan. 22, 1996); Telephone Interview with Nancy Kurtz, Office of the
Minnesota Secretary of State (Jan. 24, 1996); Telephone Interview with Sylvia Jacobs,
Office of the Mississippi Secretary of State (Jan. 19, 1996); Hartman Interview, supra
note 221; Jacobson Interview, supra note 221; Von Busch Interview, supra note 221;
Lee Interview, supra note 217; Northcott Interview, supra note 68; Harkham Interview,
supra note 222; Salinas Interview, supra note 221; Adami Interview, supra note 222;
Elek Interview, supra note 221; Telephone Interview with Clara Jenkins, Office of the
North Dakota Secretary of State (Jan. 19, 1996); Telephone Interview with Chris [last
name not available], Office of the Ohio Secretary of State (Jan. 22, 1996); Bortvit Inter
view, supra note 222; Peter son Interview, supra note 222; Letter from Dawn Brown,
Office of the Pennsylvania Department of State (Sept. 15, 1995); Albanese Interview,
supra note 218; Steigerwalt Interview, supra note 69; Nelson Interview, supra note 221;
Bailiff Interview, supra note 222; Eitt Interview, supra note 217; Berg Interview, supra
note 217; Monk Interview, supra note 217; Meyers, supra note 222; Atkinson, supra
note 218; Telephone Interview with Bernice Smith, Office of the Wisconsin Secretary of
State (Feb. 13, 1996); Cochran Interview, supra note 46.
Statistics received from Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, and Utah were based upon a
fiscal year ending on June 30. Data obtained from Texas was based upon a fiscal year
ending August 3 1 . See supra note 217, for an explanation of calendar year estimates.
Arizona, Georgia, and Utah were able to provide statistics on the number of filings
from July I, 1995 through December 3 1 , 1995, which were added to the estimated
figures (derived from the fiscal year data) for January 1 , 1995 through June 30, 1995.
California, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Penn
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vrrginia, Washington, West Vrr
ginia, and Wyoming do not maintain records that separate the total number of LLC fil
ings into domestic LLCs and foreign LLCs. See supra note 217, for an explanation of
domestic and foreign LLCs and the process of approximating the number of domestic
and foreign LLCs in states not recording separate statistics.
Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Car
olina, and West Vrrginia were unable to provide yearly statistics on new LLC filings but
were able to furnish year-to-date information. See supra note 217, for an explanation of
how year-by-year figures were approximated in Florida and Nevada. See supra note
218, for an explanation of how year-by-year figures were approximated in West Vrr
ginia. See supra note 221, for an explanation of how year-by-year figures were approxi
mated in Alabama, Connecticut, Missouri, Montana, and North Carolina. See supra note
222, for an explanation of how year-by-year figures were approximated in Kentucky.
In Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Wash
ington, and Wisconsin, actual figures were only obtained for several months into 1995.
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organized over 7000 new LLCs in 1995 alone. Not far behind were Cal
ifornia and Delaware, which received over 6000 new LLC filings each
in 1995. Other states with a significant showing in LLC formation for
1995 include Arizona, Colorado, Michigan, and Texas, each of which
created over 5000 LLCs in 1995; Connecticut and Ohio, each of which
recognized more than 4000 new LLCs; Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vrrginia, Washington, and Wisconsin each of
which welcomed over 3000 LLCs; Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maryland, and Oklahoma, which organized in excess of 2000 LLCs
each; and Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minne
sota, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, and Wyoming, each of which ac
knowledged over 900 new LLCs.225 In sum, as of December 3 1 , 1995,
over 210,000 business ventures across the United States226 had chosen
the LLC form since the IRS recognized the LLC's ability to be classi
fied as a partnership in 1988.227

To estimate the total 1995 filings in these states, the average number of filings per
month (based on the 1995 monthly statistics received) was multiplied by the number of
missing months, and added to the actual 1995 data obtained.
225. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
226. Regionally speaking, it is interesting to note that the bulk of LLCs are cur
rently located in the Midwestern and Southwestern states, the majority of whom enacted
LLC statutes prior to 1993. Together, these states boast an estimated 66,000 LLCs. In
the Midwest, since the inception of their respective statutes, Colorado, Kansas,
Oklahoma, and Utah, and Wyoming together have recognized almost 36,000 LLCs. In
the Southwest, Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas together have organized ap
proximately 30,000 LLCs. It is not clear, however, that these regions will continue to
lead the rest of the country in LLC filings. The Northeastern states of Delaware, Con
necticut, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York have already surpassed both the Mid
west and the Southwest, organizing over 37,000 LLCs through December 31, 1995.
Furthermore, on the West Coast, California, Oregon, and Washington, who have only
been registering LLCs since 1994 (California and Washington just since October of
1994), have already topped 14,000 in total filings. The South, not traditionally known
for its prominence in the business arena (save perhaps Atlanta), also appears to have
embraced LLCs. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Vrrginia have recognized an estimated 35,000

See supra notes 215-24 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 215-24 and accompanying text

LLCs.

